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RETHINKING LAWYER ETHICS TO ALLOW THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND PRIVATE 
AGREEMENTS TO CONTROL ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS 
INVOLVING INADVERTENT DISCLOSURES 
TORY L. LUCAS* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article seeks to align the rules of ethics with the rules of evidence, rules 
of civil procedure, and private agreements in confronting the vexing issue of 
inadvertent disclosures. It proposes a clear-eyed modification of Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4.4(b) to require a lawyer to use an inadvertent disclosure 
of confidential or privileged information unless prohibited by the rules of 
evidence, rules of civil procedure, or private agreement. This inadvertent-
disclosure proposal fairly balances the interests of the justice system, civility in 
the legal profession, and protection of clients. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ethics rules that regulate inadvertent disclosures of confidential or 
privileged information are a mess.1 When dealing with inadvertent disclosures, 
American lawyers currently face unclear, ill-defined, and non-uniform ethics 
rules.2 This Article seeks to clarify the vexing issue of inadvertent disclosures 
by aligning the rules of ethics with the rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, 
and private agreements. Instead of addressing state rules of ethics on a piecemeal 
basis, this Article focuses on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to 
propose a clear-eyed modification of Model Rule 4.4(b) that requires a receiving 
lawyer to use an inadvertent disclosure of confidential or privileged information 
unless prohibited by the rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, or private 
agreement.3 This inadvertent-disclosure proposal fairly balances the interests of 
the justice system, civility in the legal profession, and protection of clients.4 
 
 1. “Even though inadvertent disclosures of this sort are becoming increasingly common . . . 
the law governing the subject is still unsettled. Courts, rules drafters, and ethics opinions have 
offered conflicting advice about what receiving lawyers must do under these circumstances.” 
Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules: The Case of 
Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767, 768–69 (2005). See also Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 
Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 98-04, 1999 WL 35561, at *2 (Jan. 1999) (recognizing 
that although rules of professional conduct “provide a framework for the analysis, neither the Rules, 
prior ISBA advisory opinions, ethics opinions from other jurisdictions or case law provide 
satisfactory answers to [inadvertent disclosure] questions”); id. (lamenting that “[o]ther committees 
concerned with professional conduct have also reached quite different conclusions on these 
issues”). 
 2. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, Ethically Handling the Receipt of Possibly Privileged 
Information, 1 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 200, 205 (2011) (attempting “to provide a 
clear, clean set of rules that lawyers may apply in lieu of the incomplete and uncertain guidelines 
and balancing tests that currently exist” in the areas of inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures); 
Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise Professional 
Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 196 (2010) (“In most jurisdictions, professional conduct rules 
provide limited guidance in addressing these questions.”); id. at 242 (“Professional conduct rules 
should say what they mean and mean what they say, particularly in addressing an increasingly 
common dilemma [of inadvertent disclosures]. The bar’s expectation should not be a moving 
target.”); N.Y. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Opinion 2003-04: 
Obligations Upon Receiving A Communication Containing Confidences or Secrets Not Intended 
for The Recipient, 59 THE RECORD 420, 422 (2004) (Dec. 2003) (“Ethics opinions and rules have 
been far from uniform in answering [inadvertent disclosure] questions. . .”). 
 3. This Article is not the first to explore the intertwined purposes of the rules of ethics, rules 
of evidence, and rules of civil procedure when analyzing the proper response to inadvertent 
disclosures. See, e.g., John M. Barkett, Evidence Rule 502: The Solution to the Privilege-Protection 
Puzzle in the Digital Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1589 (2013). 
 4. This Article addresses these values, which admittedly are not the only values implicated 
by inadvertent disclosure law. One scholar has argued that “when creating professional regulations, 
we should draw on a wider range of values, including not only zealous advocacy, but also justice, 
morality, professionalism, consumer protection, consistency with other law, and the numerous 
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Currently, Model Rule 4.4(b) lightly governs inadvertent disclosures 
through a simple notification obligation that requires a receiving lawyer to notify 
the opposing lawyer. But then the Comments arm a receiving lawyer with a false 
sense of ethics that allows him to serve the client to whom the confidential or 
privileged information belongs over his own client. The Comments actually foist 
a two-tiered system of ethics upon unsuspecting clients of receiving lawyers—
some clients reap the legal benefits that allow for the use of inadvertent 
disclosures while less fortunate clients receive none of those benefits. What is 
worse is that the client to whom no benefits flow remains blissfully ignorant that 
his lawyer chose to serve the opposing lawyer’s client without so much as a 
courtesy letter to that effect. 
This Article explores a simple and straightforward option that liberates a 
receiving lawyer from a conflicting choice on how to respond to an inadvertent 
disclosure. Perhaps surprisingly, this Article suggests that the ethical obligation 
of a receiving lawyer does not—and should not—reside in the rules of ethics 
themselves. Instead, a receiving lawyer’s choice on the proper ethical response 
to inadvertent disclosures should be guided by the rules of evidence, rules of 
civil procedure, and private agreements. 
Part I of this Article gives an overview of where the law governing 
inadvertent disclosures currently stands. Part II provides the historical 
development of the law of inadvertent disclosures and how it has been 
interpreted. Part III proposes an amendment to Model Rule 4.4(b) to provide 
clarity to the murky issue of inadvertent disclosures. Part IV explores the 
practical impact of this proposal. Finally, Part V cautions that legal ethics should 
not supersede societal values; they should reflect them. 
I.  WHERE ARE WE NOW: MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4.4(B) 
The appropriate place to begin assessing any issue is its current state. The 
issue of inadvertent disclosures touches every jurisdiction that regulates the legal 
profession through rules of ethics, though these rules are far from uniform.5 For 
ease of analysis and reference, however, this Article focuses on the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct. Currently, Model Rule 4.4(b) takes a hands-off 
approach when regulating lawyers who receive inadvertent disclosures by 
creating a simple notification obligation: 
 
considerations that go into lawmaking more generally, such as the reduction of contracting costs.” 
Perlman, supra note 1, at 770. 
 5. See generally Ill. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 1 (explaining that various ethics rules and 
opinions generally ranged from requiring the receiving lawyer to notify and return upon request to 
notify only to retain and potentially use). 
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A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information6 relating 
to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know 
that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent7 
shall promptly notify the sender.8 
The purpose of this notification obligation is to permit the person who 
inadvertently disclosed the information “to take protective measures.”9 This 
Article wholeheartedly supports this ethical notification obligation as a 
professional courtesy.10 Frustratingly, however, the Comments to Model Rule 
4.4(b) cover this clear-eyed notification obligation with an opaque veneer that 
simultaneously thrusts a problematic choice upon receiving lawyers and exposes 
unwitting clients to a loss of available legal benefits.11 
Although the Comments properly avoid having the rules of ethics determine 
“whether the privileged status of a document or electronically stored information 
has been waived”12 as a “matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules,”13 a 
 
 6. “[A] document or electronically stored information’’ means “paper documents, email and 
other forms of electronically stored information, including embedded data (commonly referred to 
as ‘metadata’), that is subject to being read or put into readable form.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) cmt. 2 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016) [hereinafter MRPC]. 
 7. “A document or electronically stored information is inadvertently sent when it is 
accidentally transmitted, such as when an email or letter is misaddressed or a document or 
electronically stored information is accidentally included with information that was intentionally 
transmitted.” Id. 
 8. MRPC 4.4(b) (italics added). 
 9. Id. at cmt. 2. 
 10. This Article does not dispute that there exists “a professional consensus that the lawyer 
should notify opposing counsel when the lawyer receives material that is apparently privileged.” 
Fischer, supra note 2, at 240. 
 11. One author employed Greek mythology to describe the conundrum a lawyer faces when 
receiving inadvertent disclosures. Invoking the horrific choice between two awful options—being 
between Scylla and Charybdis—the author opined that “human traits—the desire not to oppress 
those who are weaker and the desire to champion those who are dependent on one’s care—pull 
lawyers in two directions” such that lawyers “feel bound to use our skills and knowledge for the 
clients who have committed their welfare to our keeping, but we are simultaneously uneasy about 
using all the strength we have as Goliaths of expertise when our adversary lacks even David’s sling 
and stones.” Lizabeth L. Burrell, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Importance of Internal 
Calibration in Balancing Zeal for One’s Client with Duties to the Legal System When Your 
Adversary is Incompetent, 23 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 265, 267 (2011). Disagreeing with that analogy, this 
Article contends that a lawyer who receives inadvertent disclosures does not stand between Scylla 
and Charybdis, because there are not two equally opposing, equally bad choices laid before him. 
The receiving lawyer simply must choose the superior of two conflicting choices. 
 12. MRPC 4.4(b) cmt. 2. 
 13. Id. One law professor has recognized that “the ABA has been steadfast in its assertion that 
inadvertent disclosure raises a legal, rather than a professional conduct, issue.” Schaefer, supra note 
2, at 232. This Article proposes that the Model Rules fully confront and answer the question of 
whether an attorney who receives inadvertent disclosures has an ethical obligation to use those 
materials to the fullest extent of the law. 
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follow-up Comment creates a dual-tiered set of ethical possibilities. On the one 
hand, the Comments recognize that a receiving lawyer might choose to read—
and perhaps use—inadvertent disclosures for the benefit of his client.14 On the 
other hand, the Comments entice a lawyer to avoid the slightest urge to see if 
the law allows the use of inadvertent disclosures to aid the lawyer’s client.15 In 
opposition to the interests of the receiving lawyer’s client, the Comments 
authorize the receiving lawyer to “choose to return a document or delete 
electronically stored information unread . . . when the lawyer learns before 
receiving it that it was inadvertently sent.”16 This unilateral choice to protect 
someone else’s client who falls victim to inadvertent disclosures over 
considering whether the receiving lawyer’s own client has the lawful right to use 
that material is perplexing.17 What is more perplexing is the “ethical guidance” 
that directly follows: “Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do 
so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document or delete electronically 
stored information is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to 
the lawyer.”18 Why does this guidance focus on what is not required under 
applicable law as opposed to focusing on what is allowed under applicable law? 
This guidance seemingly turns traditional ethical obligations to a client’s cause 
on their head. Such an approach is precisely backward and drives this proposal 
to ensure that a receiving lawyer properly serves his client. Before unveiling the 
proposed modification, it is wise to explore how we arrived at the present state 
of affairs. 
II.  HOW DID WE GET HERE: AN HISTORICAL LOOK AT HOW THE 
INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE JOURNEY STARTED ON THE WRONG ETHICAL 
COURSE BUT HAS BEEN HEADING TOWARD THE CORRECT DESTINATION 
The path to the proper ethical response to inadvertent disclosures has been 
traversed for decades. Although ethics rules have not followed an ideal path to 
where we find ourselves today, we nevertheless stand at the door to the proper 
solution. This Article recounts—and simultaneously criticizes—the history of 
inadvertent disclosures and contends that this long journey naturally leads to this 
Article’s proposal. 
 
 14. MRPC 4.4(b) cmt. 3. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. One article that addresses erroneous disclosures of confidential information contends that 
the “purported justifications for covering up for an adversary lawyer, to the prejudice of one’s own 
client, are simply excuses for what George Bernard Shaw would call a conspiracy of professionals 
against the laity.” Monroe H. Freedman, Erroneous Disclosure of Damaging Information: A 
Response to Professor Andrew Perlman, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 179 (2006) (citing GEORGE 
BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S DILEMMA act I (1908), reprinted in 1 COMPLETE PLAYS WITH 
PREFACES, 110 (Dodd, Mead & Company 1963). 
 18. MRPC 4.4(b) cmt. 3 (citing Rules 1.2 and 1.4). 
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A. ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 
To get a fair understanding of the historical ethical developments on 
inadvertent disclosures, our journey begins in 1992. An entire decade before the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly regulated the ethical obligations 
of a lawyer who receives inadvertent disclosures, the American Bar Association 
(the “ABA”) Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the 
“Committee”) first confronted inadvertent disclosures in ABA Formal Opinion 
92-368.19 Unfortunately, the Committee charted the wrong course on the proper 
ethical response to inadvertent disclosures.20 Placing ethical obligations squarely 
on the lawyer who receives privileged or confidential materials not intended for 
him, the Committee opined that the receiving lawyer ethically must refrain from 
looking at the materials, notify the lawyer who sent them, and abide by that 
lawyer’s instructions.21 What was the precise ethical rule that counseled this 
conclusion that essentially forced the receiving lawyer to work for the opposing 
lawyer’s client? There was no rule. 
In considering the ethical obligations of the receiving lawyer, the Committee 
admitted that it could not answer this straightforward ethical question “from a 
narrow, literalistic reading of the black letter of the Model Rules.”22 Instead of 
defining and applying an ethics rule, the Committee placed significant weight 
on “the thoughts in the Preamble” that revealed how “difficult issues of 
professional discretion” often can only “be resolved through the exercise of 
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles 
underlying the Rules.”23 Insisting that the receiving lawyer protect the 
confidences of the opposing lawyer’s client, the Committee placed tremendous 
weight on “the precepts underlying the Model Rules.”24 Recognizing that the 
entirety of the black-letter ethics rules cannot “exhaust the moral and ethical 
considerations that should inform a lawyer,”25 the Committee departed from a 
rules-based analysis. Instead, it sought shelter in a “larger, and more 
fundamental, framework” that included “(i) the importance the Model Rules 
 
 19. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992) [hereinafter 
Formal Op. 92-368]. 
 20. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 1 (“ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 . . . places the burden on 
the wrong party, asking the receiving lawyer to act contrary to the interests of that lawyer’s client 
in order to protect the interests of the careless lawyer and that lawyer’s client.”). 
 21. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. This is akin to creating a rule in a competitive card 
game that if you show your cards to an opponent, you have a legitimate expectation that your 
opponent will not look. At least in the first instance, such a rule places responsibility in the wrong 
person. See Mass. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1999-4 (1999) (opining that a duty of 
zealous representation for one’s own client forbids a receiving lawyer from returning a privileged 
letter). 
 22. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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give to maintaining client confidentiality, (ii) the law governing waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege, (iii) the law governing missent property, (iv) the 
similarity between the circumstances here addressed and other conduct the 
profession universally condemns, and (v) the receiving lawyer’s obligations to 
his client.”26 
This “larger, and more fundamental, framework” for considering ethical 
obligations—with hardly any analysis of the ethics rules—freed the Committee 
to trek an odd analytical path that placed significant ethical restraints on the 
receiving lawyer. The Committee first explored how “confidentiality is a 
fundamental aspect of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”27 
Curiously, the Committee analyzed only two ethics rules in concluding that the 
receiving lawyer must bow to the wishes of the sending lawyer when it comes 
to inadvertent disclosures. First, the Committee recognized that “Model Rule 1.6 
codifies a lawyer’s obligation to keep the confidences of his client.”28 In 
breathtaking fashion, the Committee used ethereal policy arguments to identify 
a “strong policy in favor of confidentiality” that allowed it to openly dissemble 
Rule 1.6 to place its duty on the shoulders of the receiving lawyer rather than 
the sending lawyer.29 Second, the Committee gave a slight and fleeting nod to 
the notion that ethics rules actually might require a receiving lawyer to use 
inadvertent materials for the benefit of his client. Reservedly acknowledging a 
long history of ethics rules requiring a lawyer to zealously advocate for his 
client,30 the Committee quickly dismissed this line of analysis by explaining that 
“there are many limitations on the extent to which a lawyer may go ‘all out’ for 
the client” that restrain “uncontrolled advocacy.”31 
The Committee hardly sought to balance the obligations that sending and 
receiving lawyers owed to their respective clients.32 Instead of a fair analysis of 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. To be fair, inadvertent “disclosures create a dilemma for both sending and receiving 
attorneys: The sender wants to mitigate the damage, while the recipient wants to use the information 
to the extent doing so does not violate any legal or professional conduct obligations.” Schaefer, 
supra note 2, at 195. 
 30. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. On the possibility that ethics rules might require a 
receiving lawyer to use inadvertent disclosures for his client’s benefit, the Committee cited “the 
‘zealous’ representation of Canon 7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility” and the 
requirement “that a lawyer’s ‘commitment and dedication to the interests of the client’ referred to 
in the Comment to Model Rule 1.3” might obligate the receiving lawyer “to capitalize on an error 
of this sort on the part of opposing counsel.” Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. The Committee’s lack of desire to scour the Model Rules to analyze the ethical 
responsibilities of both the sending lawyer and receiving lawyer is disappointing. Because the 
Committee did not conduct a rules-based analysis of the proper ethical response to inadvertent 
disclosures, this Article will forego doing so, because such an analysis is unnecessary to support 
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the rights of each client, the Committee myopically focused on the strawman 
harms caused by the receiving lawyer’s use of inadvertent disclosures while 
heaping utopian protections on the opposing lawyer’s client.33 This Article’s 
proposal more fairly balances the interests of both clients while acknowledging 
that the rules of evidence, rules of procedure, and private agreements provide far 
better protections than a perverse reading of various penumbras of ethics rules. 
As to the rules of evidence, the Committee wrote that courts tend to show, 
“with few exceptions, an unwillingness to permit mere inadvertence to constitute 
a waiver” of the attorney-client privilege when a lawyer inadvertently discloses 
client materials.34 The Committee recognized that early in the evolution of the 
issue, the majority of courts created a negligence test to decide when inadvertent 
disclosures waived the privilege.35 With a wink to analytical balance, the 
Committee recognized “the minority view” that “any unforced disclosure of 
attorney-client privileged communications destroys confidentiality and 
 
this Article’s proposal. Suffice it to say that a number of Model Rules are relevant when considering 
inadvertent disclosures. See MRPC 1.1 (mandating that a lawyer “provide competent representation 
to a client,” which arguably applies to the sending lawyer’s obligation to protect privileged 
information and the receiving lawyer’s obligation to use inadvertent disclosures if permitted under 
the governing substantive law); MRPC 1.2 (obligating a lawyer to “consult with the client as to the 
means by which [the objectives of representation] are to be pursued,” which arguably requires a 
lawyer to advise a client and get informed consent before the lawyer waives the legal right to use 
inadvertent disclosures); MRPC 1.3 (requiring that a lawyer “act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client” could support either use or nonuse of inadvertent disclosures 
depending on how one interprets Comment 1; favoring use if one must zealously advocate for a 
client’s interest; favoring nonuse if one avoids trying to “press for every advantage” by exercising 
restraint through “professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be 
pursued”); MRPC 1.4 (requiring that a lawyer “reasonably consult with the client about the means 
by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished” probably requires informing the client if 
the lawyer wishes to forego pursuing the legal benefits available to a client through the use of 
inadvertent disclosures); MRPC 1.6(a) (placing the duty to protect confidential information directly 
and only on the lawyer who represents that client); Id. at (c) (mandating that “[a] lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access 
to, information relating to the representation of a client,” which clearly and unmistakably does not 
place the ethical obligation on inadvertent disclosures on the receiving lawyer); MRPC 1.7 
(obligating a lawyer to avoid conflicts of interest arguably prohibits a lawyer who receives 
inadvertent disclosures of privileged or confidential information to serve an opposing client over a 
current client if substantive rules authorize the use of that information unless the lawyer gets the 
informed consent of the client to forego such use). See also Ill. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 1 
(hypothesizing that a receiving lawyer may violate his ethical obligations by not using inadvertent 
disclosures because that would create a conflict of interest in that the receiving lawyer would serve 
the sending lawyer’s client at the expense of his own). 
 33. For example, it seems hardly debatable to readily recognize that receiving lawyers “as 
fiduciaries are necessarily—and rightly—influenced by the interests of their own clients.” Schaefer, 
supra note 2, at 246. 
 34. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. 
 35. Id. 
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terminates the privilege.”36 Dismissing these courts as being hostile to the 
attorney-client privilege, the Committee preened that “the Model Rules certainly 
reflect a far more positive view toward the importance of maintaining the 
confidentiality of attorney-client communications.”37 
Before moving so quickly to the Committee’s next specious argument, it is 
important to ask whether it was prudent for the Committee to interpret various 
penumbras of the rules of ethics without properly analyzing the importance of 
the rules of evidence. The intersection of the rules of ethics and the rules of 
evidence requires one to stop and pause. Indeed, the approach to this tricky 
intersection determines whether the law takes the proper path toward the proper 
conclusion. The Committee’s early decision to ignore the legal rights that clients 
might enjoy from the rules of evidence was the precise moment that ethics rules 
veered off the proper course. If the rules of evidence allow the use of inadvertent 
disclosures to support a client’s case, why would the rules of ethics interfere 
with such use? That question lies at the heart of this criticism toward the current 
state of ethics. But instead of pontificating on an abstract preamble, suffice it to 
say for now that the rules of ethics should look to the rules of evidence for 
guidance on how to resolve the issue of inadvertent disclosures. 
After the Committee completed its shallow analysis of the ethics rules and 
displayed a lack of curiosity of how the rules of evidence might elucidate the 
proper response to inadvertent disclosures, the Committee analyzed the law of 
bailments.38 Yes, the Committee employed the theory of bailments to bolster its 
conclusion that a receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations run toward the opposing 
lawyer’s client.39 Even though the Committee freed itself from the strictures of 
black-letter ethics rules,40 it was content to rely on the “black letter of the law of 
bailment” under property law. This reliance on the law of property is a mistaken 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Peter C. Scott & Valerie C. Raudonis, Practical Ethics: Inadvertent Disclosure of 
Confidential Materials, 5 NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR NEWS (n.s.) 6, 6 (Sept. 7, 1994) (agreeing that 
ABA Formal Opinion 92-368’s bailment analogy “stretches the Opinion’s analysis to its limits”). 
 40. To be fair, it is a misguided belief that a black-letter rule can be created for every situation. 
Indeed, the Model Rules “are rules of reason;” their interpretation should serve “the purposes of 
legal representation” and “the law itself.” MRPC preamble [14]. Preamble 15 underscores how 
legal ethics simply are part of the larger fabric of the law itself: 
  The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role. That context 
includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific 
obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. The Comments are 
sometimes used to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under such other law. 
Id. at preamble [15]. Buttressing this Article’s proposal, reason dictates that the rules of ethics 
indeed should look to “the larger fabric of the law” to clothe itself on the proper response to 
inadvertent disclosures. Any other response leaves the receiving lawyer’s client naked in stark 
contrast to the protective clothing draped on the opposing lawyer’s client. 
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diversion because the rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private 
agreements should govern a receiving lawyer’s ethical response to inadvertent 
disclosures. In applying the law of bailment, the Committee concluded that a 
receiving lawyer must not use inadvertent disclosures.41 Strikingly, the 
Committee admitted that the black-letter law of property was not entirely clear 
by recognizing that a bailee’s right to use bailed property “is governed by the 
intention of the parties to the bailment.”42 Bailment law gives the parties the 
option to rely on express agreements to govern the use of bailed property.43 
Ultimately, the Committee awkwardly admitted that there really is “no rule of 
universal application” and confessed that every “case must be governed by its 
own circumstances.”44 One circumstance that would impact the ability of a 
bailee to use bailed property would be a case in which “the consent of the owner 
to the use may be fairly presumed.”45 This reluctant acknowledgement forms a 
primary consideration in crafting a proposed amendment to the rules of ethics. 
As yet another tease, this Article’s proposed rule of ethics would authorize 
lawyers to enter private agreements on the use of inadvertent disclosures, which 
would entirely remove any consideration of how general rules of bailment would 
govern the issue.  
The Committee then oddly diverted to discuss the proper ethical response 
when parties agree to a key term in a contract that is then inadvertently omitted 
from the final written contract.46 The Committee explained that an older ethics 
opinion relied on Model Rules 1.2(d) and 4.1(b) to announce that a lawyer could 
not engage in fraud by capitalizing on a clerical error.47 Admitting that the fraud 
opinion was “not on all fours with the instant situation,” the Committee 
nonetheless was persuaded by “its charitable view toward inadvertence, its 
unwillingness to permit parties to capitalize on errors, its recognition of a 
limitation on client decision-making authority and its respect for the role of 
counsel all support the position advanced in this opinion as to counsel’s proper 
conduct upon the inadvertent receipt of confidential information.”48 Building on 
its “dim view” of lawyers’ trying to “take advantage” of confidential 
information, the Committee felt that its conclusion was bolstered by this 
analysis.49 Because this analogy is removed from common sense, this Article 
will continue without a response. 
 
 41. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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Finally, in a section entitled “Good Sense and Reciprocity,” the Committee 
gave a nod to imprecise notions of reciprocity and courtesy among lawyers to 
bolster its conclusion that a receiving lawyer’s obligations run less toward his 
client and more toward the opposing lawyer’s client.50 In a flurry of 
unconstrained anecdotes and undocumented claims, the Committee suggested 
that “[t]he credibility and professionalism inherent in doing the right thing can, 
in some significant ways, enhance the strength of one’s case, one’s standing with 
the other party and opposing counsel, and one’s stature before the court.”51 This 
list of virtues are mere conclusions rather than reasons.52 Finding no benefit to a 
receiving lawyer’s use of inadvertent disclosures, the Committee concluded that 
the opposing lawyer controls all confidential, privileged information and 
materials after disclosure.53 This control even extends to the receiving lawyer’s 
ethical obligations.54 This Article’s proposal also seeks to “do the right thing” 
while applying good sense and reciprocity, yet it does so without forcing a 
receiving lawyer to labor under a conflict of interest. 
The Committee made a good-faith effort in its first impression to resolve the 
ever-increasing problem of inadvertent disclosures.55 The Committee should be 
applauded for recognizing the “increasingly important” question of how to 
handle inadvertent disclosures and for having the foresight to predict that it 
would become “ever more likely that through inadvertence, privileged or 
 
 50. Id. But see Freedman, supra note 17, at 180 (“The traditional ethic of zeal is another 
casualty of this insistence on an overriding obligation of ‘professional courtesy,’ or of taking care 
of each other to our clients’ detriment.”). 
 51. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19 (italics added). 
 52. Nevertheless, this Article will demonstrate that these virtues actually are best served by a 
rule of ethics that looks to rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private agreements on 
inadvertent disclosures. 
 53. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. 
 54. Id. 
 55. One scholar implicitly supported the Committee’s analytical approach to inadvertent 
disclosures: 
  Because rules are inherently limited, when they fail to afford adequate direction, 
lawyers should not automatically do what appears to be in the immediate best interests of 
their clients. Rather, it is precisely in the moment of convergence created by unclear or 
inapplicable rules and potentially conflicting legal values and obligations that an attorney 
has a heightened duty to exercise professional judgment and discretion. This discretion need 
not be arbitrary and ungrounded. To guide it, lawyers should bring to ethical decision 
making the same processes and modes of analysis they apply to other legal puzzles. Thus, 
when addressing ethical questions, the text of the rules is the obvious starting point. 
However, if that text does not provide clear guidance, then lawyers ought next to consult 
the purposes behind the rules and the principles upon which they rest. 
Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the Law of Mistake: Using 
Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1295–96 
(1999). 
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confidential materials will be produced to opposing counsel.”56 The 
Committee’s most critical error was its failure to explore how rules of legal 
ethics properly intersect with the rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and 
private agreements. Simply put, the Committee looked in the wrong direction, 
even if for the right reasons. The Committee seemed obsessed with placing 
obligations on the receiving lawyer that ran toward the opposing client while 
spending little time pondering whether the receiving lawyer’s client had any 
substantive rights. A glancing read of the Committee’s opinion leaves one with 
the notion that the Committee had formed its conclusion and then reasoned 
toward it. In the process, the Committee deployed a paternalistic approach 
toward the opposing lawyer’s client and ignored options available to the 
receiving lawyer’s client. 
In analyzing toward a pre-calculated conclusion to protect the confidences 
of an opposing lawyer’s client, the Committee missed an opportunity to serve 
the clients of both the receiving lawyer and opposing lawyer. This Article’s 
proposal seeks to balance the interests of both clients without tipping the scales 
in one direction. If a lawyer wants to protect the inadvertent disclosures of 
privileged information belonging to another lawyer’s client, then that lawyer has 
two voluntary choices. First, the lawyer may—after full disclosure and informed 
consent—enter a private agreement with his client that prohibits that lawyer 
from reviewing or attempting to use inadvertent disclosures. This option creates 
a unilateral disarming of a client’s ability to use inadvertently disclosed 
materials even if the rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure would allow 
such use. Second, the lawyer may enter a private agreement with another lawyer 
that precludes both lawyers from using inadvertent disclosures. This second 
option offers a bilateral agreement in which neither client receives the benefits 
that the law might afford for the use of inadvertent disclosures while ensuring 
that neither client suffers the burdens either. 
Even though private agreements are appropriate methods to address 
inadvertent disclosures, this Article contends that a set of default rules on how 
to respond to inadvertent disclosures should reside in the rules of evidence and 
rules of civil procedure. If in the interest of justice, the rules of evidence and 
rules of civil procedure authorize the use of inadvertent disclosures, only a 
perverse sense of justice would instigate that the rules of ethics should preempt 
such use. 
There remains one more criticism of ABA Formal Opinion 92-368. By 
disregarding the black-letter ethics rules in favor of a “larger, and more 
fundamental, framework” that relied on “the thoughts in the Preamble,”57 the 
Committee handcuffed the receiving lawyer’s ability to use inadvertent 
disclosures for the benefit of his client. If the Preamble’s thoughts indeed 
 
 56. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. 
 57. Id. 
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established a larger, and more fundamental, framework for considering ethical 
obligations, there are other parts of the Preamble that favor the receiving 
lawyer’s use of inadvertent disclosures to aid his client and not the opposing 
lawyer’s client. 
Preamble 2 recognizes that lawyers perform a myriad of functions with 
differing responsibilities.58 When serving as a trusted advisor, a lawyer must 
provide his “client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights 
and obligations” while explaining “their practical implications.”59 When serving 
in an advocate role, the lawyer must “zealously assert[] the client’s position 
under the rules of the adversary system.”60 When serving as a negotiator, a 
lawyer must seek results “advantageous to the client but consistent with 
requirements of honest dealings with others.”61 When serving as an evaluator, a 
lawyer must examine “a client’s legal affairs” and report “about them to the 
client or to others.”62 Every one of these roles intimates how a lawyer should 
respond to inadvertent disclosures. The first and most pressing obligation is to 
explain to the client his rights when the lawyer receives inadvertent disclosures 
of privileged or confidential information belonging to an opposing client. If the 
rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure authorize a lawyer to use 
inadvertent disclosures to aid his client, it would be odd that the rules of ethics 
would prohibit such use if properly serving the various functions recognized by 
Preamble 2.63 
Preamble 9 identifies a basic principle underlying the rules of ethics: a 
lawyer has an obligation to “zealously . . . protect and pursue a client’s 
legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a 
professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal 
system.”64 The proposal in this Article fully balances and addresses the 
contentions of the Committee’s opinion as well as the aspirations of Preamble 
9. The rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure are “the bounds of the law” 
that direct lawyers on how to conduct themselves in “the justice system.”65 If 
these substantive laws authorize the use of inadvertent disclosures, then the only 
legitimate response by the rules of ethics would be to authorize—indeed, to 
 
 58. MRPC, preamble [2]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.; Fischer, supra note 2, at 248 (“Our legal system remains, however, an adversarial 
process and it is unrealistic to expect lawyers to behave like angels rather than advocates.”). 
 61. MRPC, preamble [2]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Preamble 5 also supports the receiving lawyer’s use of inadvertent disclosures if the rules 
of evidence and procedure allow: “A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the 
law . . . [including] in professional service to clients . . . A lawyer should use the law’s procedures 
only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate 
respect for the legal system. . .” MRPC preamble [5]. 
 64. MRPC, preamble [9]. 
 65. Id. 
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encourage—a lawyer to zealously use those laws for his client’s benefit rather 
than to forego the law’s blessings in favor of an opposing client.  
Preambles 1 and 8 readily support this Article’s inadvertent-disclosure 
proposal, which balances the interests of the justice system, civility in the legal 
profession, and protection of clients. Preamble 1 reminds every lawyer that 
being “a member of the legal profession” provides duties as “a representative of 
clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”66 Preamble 8 recognizes that although 
these duties might seemingly conflict, they usually act in harmony.67 When all 
of a lawyer’s duties align in harmony and when the opposing client is well-
represented, a lawyer is not shackled by obligations to the opposing lawyer’s 
client.68 In that instance, a lawyer is freed to serve as “a zealous advocate on 
behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done.”69 That 
is precisely why the rules of ethics should not shackle a receiving lawyer from 
using inadvertent disclosures; instead, the rules of ethics should free the 
receiving lawyer who receives inadvertent disclosures to carry out his ethical 
obligations by zealously advocating for his client consistent with the rules of 
evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private agreements.70 
B. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Insurance 
To this point, this Article has focused somewhat on the law’s theoretical 
response to inadvertent disclosures. As with all legal issues, however, facts—
and not law—should be the focus of the analysis. All legal analysis boils down 
to people and the facts. Don’t misunderstand—law and facts are both important. 
Because they enjoy a symbiotic relationship, law and facts are worthless on their 
 
 66. MRPC, preamble [1]. 
 67. MRPC, preamble [8]. (“A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer 
of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious.”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Preamble 9 supports this Article’s proposal more than the Committee’s conclusion: 
  In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. 
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s 
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining 
an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. . . . [M]any difficult issues of 
professional discretion . . . must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional 
and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These principles 
include the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate 
interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil 
attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system. 
MRPC, preamble [9]. This Article’s proposal more fairly balances these competing interests by 
forcing the rules of ethics to yield to the rules of evidence, rules of procedure, and private 
agreements. 
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own; they look for and rely on each other.71 Law and facts “go together like a 
lock and key” in that “[t]he application of the law to the facts unlocks the proper 
legal conclusion.”72 The point here is that as the law explores the proper ethical 
response to inadvertent disclosures, the starting point should not be the law; it 
should be the types of factual scenarios that demand a response from the law. 
That seems curious because this Article is being published in a law review as 
opposed to a fact review. Be that as it may, the focal point should be the facts 
that give rise to the legal issue. What types of facts drive this inadvertent-
disclosure proposal? 
Even though it is a quarter-century old, the case of Aerojet-General Corp. 
v. Transport Indemnity Insurance73 guides proper thinking on inadvertent 
disclosures more so than Formal Opinion 92-368.74 Indeed, it is not 
inconsequential that Aerojet wholly dismissed the reasoning and significance of 
the Committee’s opinion on how legal ethics should respond to inadvertent 
disclosures.75 In Aerojet, the California Court of Appeals faced a lawyer’s 
“innocent [receipt] of privileged documents prepared by [opposing] counsel” in 
a complex commercial case.76 The receiving lawyer did not receive the 
privileged information directly from opposing counsel, but instead “received a 
packet of documents” regarding the litigation from his client’s employee who 
received it from the client’s insurance broker who apparently received it from 
opposing counsel.77 In that packet, the receiving lawyer discovered a memo by 
opposing counsel concerning litigation strategy that revealed an undisclosed-
yet-material witness.78 The receiving lawyer used the privileged information to 
depose the material witness.79 When opposing counsel discovered that the 
receiving lawyer had used privileged information without notifying them, they 
moved for sanctions against the receiving lawyer.80 The receiving lawyer 
 
 71. Tory L. Lucas, Henry J. Friendly: Designed to Be A Great Federal Judge, 65 DRAKE L. 
REV. 421, 480 (2017) (“The law is worthless without facts and facts are worthless without the 
law.”). 
 72. Id. Carl Sandburg had a markedly different approach that held a more robust rhetorical 
flourish: “If the facts are against you, argue the law. If the law is against you, argue the facts. If the 
law and the facts are against you, pound the table and yell like hell.” CARL SANDBURG, THE 
PEOPLE, YES 181 (1936). 
 73. Aerojet-General Corporation v. Transport Indemnity Insurance, 18. Cal. App. 4th 996 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 74. The case actually dealt with intentional disclosures vice inadvertent disclosures, but the 
distinction is hardly critical when analyzing the proper response from the vantage of legal ethics. 
Fischer, supra note 2. 
 75. See Aerojet-General, 18. Cal. App. 4th at 1003. 
 76. Id. at 999. 
 77. Id. at 997. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1000. 
 80. Aerojet-General, 18. Cal. App. 4th at 1001. 
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“acknowledged that he had no reason to believe that [opposing counsel or their] 
clients had consented to the disclosure of the documents,” that “he reviewed 
them,” and that he “did not immediately notify any opposing counsel, the special 
discovery master, or the trial court that he had received them.”81 
The trial court sanctioned the receiving lawyer’s firm for failing to timely 
advise opposing counsel that the receiving lawyer had received the “undeniably 
. . . privileged communication between opposing counsel and his client detailing 
pretrial and trial strategies” without the consent of opposing counsel.82 The trial 
court explained that the receiving lawyer’s conduct was “unethical and in bad 
faith,” because he “failed to contact opposing counsel” when he received the 
materials, “failed to investigate how his client obtained the documents,” “failed 
to tell his partners he had received the documents from” his client, “looked at 
the documents,” “used the information” in the documents “to his own 
advantage,” and “destroyed the documents.”83 The trial court sanctioned the 
receiving lawyer’s firm for $22,499.74 to cover expenses incurred to litigate the 
motion for sanctions.84 The trial court also ordered that the witness who was 
discovered in the privileged materials was “precluded from testifying during any 
phase of the trial.”85 
The Court of Appeals framed the legal issue in a different way: what is the 
duty of a lawyer “who, without misconduct or fault, obtains or learns of a 
confidential communication among opposing counsel, or between opposing 
counsel and opposing counsel’s client[?]”86 Even assuming that some type of 
duty existed, the court acknowledged the difficulty “when the confidential 
communication reveals a relevant and potentially helpful witness.”87 The court 
explicitly recognized that discovery was a key consideration when addressing 
inadvertent disclosures, which implicitly invoked rules of evidence and rules of 
procedure over rules of ethics: “There is no State Bar rule of professional 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1002. 
 85. Aerojet-General, 18. Cal. App. 4th at 1002. 
 86. Id. In addition to defining the precise issue, the court emphasized what was not at issue: 
[The receiving lawyer] did not violate any laws, statutory or decisional, or any rules of court 
or rules of professional conduct in the manner by which he obtained the subject information. 
It is undisputed that [the receiving lawyer] is free of any wrongdoing in his initial receipt 
of the documents. 
Id. This sentiment intuitively supports this Article’s proposal that the rules of evidence, rules of 
civil procedure, and private agreements should govern the issue of inadvertent disclosure; not the 
rules of ethics. Over time, the opposite occurred. It is time to correct this inadvertent divergence 
from the proper path on the ethical response to inadvertent disclosures. 
 87. Id. 
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conduct, no rule of court nor any statute specifically addressing this situation 
and mandating or defining any duty under such circumstances.”88 
Addressing head-on the issue of whether the receiving lawyer’s conduct 
required sanctions, the court refused to fault the receiving lawyer for examining 
the privileged information for the benefit of his client.89 Rejecting opposing 
counsel’s argument that the receiving lawyer “should not even have read the 
documents,” the court recognized that in complex litigation involving large 
amounts of data, parties, lawyers, and documents, swamped lawyers who receive 
loads of materials cannot be expected to work for someone other than the client 
when reviewing the materials.90 
Turning to the rules of evidence in the absence of a rule of ethics, the court 
cautioned that the “attorney-client privilege is a shield against deliberate 
intrusion” and “not an insurer against inadvertent disclosure.”91 The court 
explained that “not all information that passes privately between attorney and 
client is entitled to remain confidential in the literal sense,” citing discovery and 
the identification of witnesses as obvious examples.92 In a blockbuster 
conclusion that freed the receiving lawyer to work on behalf of his client and not 
the client of opposing counsel, the court held that “whether the existence and 
identity of a witness or other nonprivileged information is revealed through 
formal discovery or inadvertence, the end result is the same: the [receiving 
lawyer] is entitled to the use of that witness or information.”93 Even though this 
conclusion arms this Article’s proposal, the court did not stop there. 
The court was not distracted by some mysterious metaphysical duty that a 
receiving lawyer might owe to the clients of opposing counsel or “his adversaries 
in the litigation.”94 In contrast, the court elucidated the receiving lawyer’s 
primary duty “to protect the interests of his own clients.”95 The court made sure 
to place in context its holding that whenever privileged or confidential 
information is received by a lawyer “through no fault or misconduct of his own,” 
then the receiving lawyer is entitled to use the information.96 Revealing its 
commitment to the rules of evidence and sensitivity to the use of privileged 
information, the court clarified that the receiving lawyer’s use is not unlimited 
 
 88. Id. Unfortunately, the temptation to craft an ethical rule was too strong for ethics 
professionals to bear, so they began work to regulate inadvertent disclosures under the rules of 
ethics. 
 89. Aerojet-General, 18. Cal. App. 4th at 1005–06. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1004. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (italics added). 
 94. Aerojet-General, 18. Cal. App. 4th at 1005. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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but is always “subject to the usual rules of evidence.”97 This recognition 
underlies a major premise behind this Article’s proposal—the rules of evidence 
should inform the rules of ethics on inadvertent disclosures and not the other 
way around. 
The court drove home the principle that the receiving lawyer innocently 
received, reviewed, and tried to use the information that was sent to him. Most 
acutely, the court decided that the receiving lawyer was required to use the 
information for his client’s cause.98 The court was unmoved by any distinction 
as to “the manner in which [the receiving lawyer] obtained the information,” 
including inadvertent disclosure “or if it had been mistakenly sent to him through 
the mail or by facsimile transmission.”99 The court reiterated that any evidentiary 
“question of waiver” would be a separate issue. As for the direct issue of what 
duty a receiving lawyer has once he acquires “information in a manner that was 
not due to his own fault or wrongdoing,” the court held that the receiving 
lawyer’s “professional obligation demands that he utilize his knowledge about 
the case on his client’s behalf.”100 Signaling the court’s discomfort to decide a 
case without much guidance from existing law, however, the court hedged that 
“[i]n the absence of any clear statutory, regulatory or decisional authority 
imposing a duty of immediate disclosure of the inadvertent receipt of privileged 
information, we conclude the sanction order cannot stand.”101 
The court’s reasoning supports this Article’s proposed modification of the 
rules of legal ethics. It demonstrates the willingness of a court, early in the 
discussion about inadvertent disclosures, to recognize two important principles 
that should mark the boundaries of inadvertent disclosures. First, a receiving 
lawyer’s duty runs primarily to his client; not the opposing counsel’s client. 
Second, the rules of evidence and rules of procedure are strong enough to protect 
privileged information and regulate the law of inadvertent disclosures without a 
preemptive rerouting of the issue through a disoriented set of ethics rules. 
 
 97. Id. at 1006. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Aerojet-General, 18. Cal. App. 4th at 1006. This recognition tracks the sentiment 
expressed earlier that there is no ethical distinction when it comes to inadvertent or intentional 
disclosures of confidential or privileged information. The receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations 
should remain the same in either scenario if guided by the rules of evidence, rules of procedure, or 
private agreements. One law review article proposed “a new ‘inadvertent disclosure’ professional 
conduct rule that purposely, but perhaps ironically, contains no reference to the term ‘inadvertent.’” 
Schaefer, supra note 2, at 197; see also Fischer, supra note 2, at 204 (“[T]he distinction between 
inadvertent and unauthorized disclosure is artificial and should be rejected in favor of a unified 
term—unintended disclosure.”). 
 100. Aerojet-General, 18. Cal. App. 4th at 1006. 
 101. Id. at 1006–07. 
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C. ABA Formal Opinion 94-382 
A year after Aerojet, the Committee confronted the related topic of 
intentional disclosures of confidential information. The Committee used this 
opportunity to pivot slightly toward a better course than it took in its 1992 
opinion on inadvertent disclosures. The Committee formulated the following 
rule, which was less restrictive on the receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations 
toward intentional disclosures: 
A lawyer who receives on an unauthorized basis materials of an adverse party 
that she knows to be privileged or confidential should, upon recognizing the 
privileged or confidential nature of the materials, either refrain from reviewing 
such materials or review them only to the extent required to determine how 
appropriately to proceed; she should notify her adversary’s lawyer that she has 
such materials and should either follow instructions of the adversary’s lawyer 
with respect to the disposition of the materials, or refrain from using the 
materials until a definitive resolution of the proper disposition of the materials 
is obtained from a court.102 
This subtle shift away from placing the receiving lawyer under the control of the 
opposing lawyer was a step in the right direction. A mere two years earlier, the 
Committee had declared that a lawyer who received inadvertently disclosed 
privileged or confidential materials shall refrain from looking at the materials, 
notify the lawyer who sent them, and abide by that lawyer’s instructions.103 By 
1994, the Committee started an about-face by taking the critical step in the 
opposite direction to recognize that there are some situations in which a 
receiving lawyer might have the legal right to use confidential or privileged 
information.104 
In arriving at this more lenient conclusion, the Committee recognized 
opinions from state bar ethics committees that the Committee had wholly 
ignored two years earlier.105 The gist of these ethics opinions was that a receiving 
lawyer had little-or-no ethical obligations to the adverse party and may use 
privileged or confidential materials to benefit his client. Feeling constrained by 
its earlier opinion and unwilling to move as far as some state ethics committees, 
the Committee was uncomfortable that a receiving lawyer could make 
“unlimited use of such materials” or place “an adversary at the mercy” of those 
who had confidential information.106 The Committee moved a few steps from its 
earlier ruling when it confessed that there should not be “an absolute rule that 
would prohibit a receiving lawyer from reviewing or using such materials under 
 
 102. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94–382 (1994) [hereinafter 
Formal Op. 94–382]. 
 103. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 19. (italics added). 
 104. Formal Op. 94-382, supra note 102. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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all circumstances.”107 The Committee further declared, “An absolute rule, 
couched in terms of professional responsibilities, that required a receiving 
lawyer to return such materials could prejudice the legitimate rights of the 
receiving lawyer’s client to employ such materials in the prosecution or defense 
of a legal action.”108 Finding a more proper balance between the receiving 
lawyer and the opposing lawyer, the Committee moved to its more just rule by 
affording “the adverse party a reasonable and timely opportunity to resort to 
judicial remedies to determine legal rights and allow the receiving lawyer, under 
appropriate circumstances, to use relevant materials in the prosecution or 
defense of an action on behalf of her client.”109 Like the court in Aerojet, the 
Committee recognized that the law outside of legal ethics might provide legal 
rights to a receiving lawyer’s client. 
In just two short years, the receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations were 
diminishing. The trend was moving away from an absolutist restriction of the 
receiving lawyer’s ethical options to use another client’s confidential or 
privileged information after it was revealed (inadvertently or intentionally). 
Instead of requiring the receiving lawyer to obey the opposing lawyer’s 
demands, the only crystal-clear ethics rule that was now coming into view was 
that the receiving lawyer must notify the opposing lawyer that the receiving 
lawyer possessed privileged or confidential information of the opposing 
lawyer’s client. 
D. Model Rule 4.4(b) 
An analysis of Model Rule 4.4(b) showcases where the rules of ethics 
currently fit in the broader context of the proper response to inadvertent 
disclosures. It is important to realize what Model Rule 4.4(b) governs and what 
it does not. Within the rule, there exists an underlying, yet implicit supposition 
that inadvertent disclosures should be governed, for the most part, by the rules 
of evidence and rules of civil procedure. This Article will provide the impetus 
to complete the transition fully by explicitly placing issues of inadvertent 
disclosure under the rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private 
agreements so that all lawyers, clients, and courts see the issue more clearly and 
uniformly. 
Until 2002, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct stood silent on 
inadvertent disclosures. Various state ethics opinions had reached widely varied 
conclusions on a receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations, while the ABA had 
issued two formal ethics opinions that placed ethical obligations on the receiving 
lawyer. When Model Rule 4.4(b) was promulgated, it undoubtedly moved away 
from the notion that the receiving lawyer stands under the direction of the 
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sending lawyer. As quoted above, Model Rule 4.4(b) loosely regulated 
inadvertent disclosures by imparting a simple notification obligation on the 
receiving lawyer110 so that opposing counsel could “take protective 
measures.”111 All other conduct implicitly became subject to conscience or rules 
of court.112 
Somewhat perplexingly, Model Rule 4.4(b) avoids the pressing issue of 
whether the receiving lawyer should use inadvertently disclosed materials for 
the benefit of the lawyer’s client, even though the nucleus of the Model Rules 
requires that a lawyer should zealously use that evidence for his client’s benefit. 
The Comments to Model Rule 4.4(b) quizzically avoid two questions: (1) 
“[w]hether the [receiving] lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as 
returning the document or electronically stored information” and (2) “whether 
the privileged status of a document or electronically stored information has been 
waived.”113 The Comments surmise that these questions are “matter[s] of law 
beyond the scope of these Rules.”114 This approach misses the issue. The 
answers to how the rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure address 
inadvertent disclosures are not beside the point; they are the point. Knowing 
how those rules govern inadvertent disclosures should be the central focus in 
meting out ethical duties. 
No sooner do the Comments avoid these critical issues that impact the 
quality of a lawyer’s representation of his client than a follow-up Comment 
unleashes a wishy-washy murk by suggesting an ethical restriction outside the 
scope of the expressed duty.115 If a receiving lawyer looks to the Comments on 
how to proceed after satisfying his notification obligation, he is met with nearly 
coin-flip guidance. A potentially dual-tiered system emerges out of view of 
unsuspecting clients in which some clients could receive the legal benefits of 
inadvertent disclosures while other not-so-lucky clients are kept in the dark as 
their lawyers choose to forego the rightful use of such disclosures. On one hand, 
the Comments recognize that a receiving lawyer might choose to read—and 
perhaps use—inadvertent disclosures for the benefit of his client. On the other 
end of the spectrum of ethical choices, the Comments entice a lawyer to avoid 
 
 110. MRPC 4.4(b) (italics added). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Beyond a simple notification obligation, “the Commission decided against trying to sort 
out a lawyer’s possible legal obligations in connection with examining and using confidential 
documents that come into her possession through the inadvertence or wrongful act of another.” 
Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the 
Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 469 (2002). 
 113. MRPC 4.4(b) cmt. 2. 
 114. Id. This Article proposes that the Model Rules fully confront and answer the question of 
whether an attorney who receives inadvertently disclosed materials has an ethical obligation to use 
those materials to the fullest extent of the law. 
 115. Id. at cmt. 3. 
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even the slightest urge to see if the law allows the use of inadvertent disclosures 
to aid the lawyer’s client. The Comments authorize the receiving lawyer to 
“choose to return a document or delete electronically stored information unread 
. . . when the lawyer learns before receiving it that it was inadvertently sent.”116 
It is perplexing to ponder why a receiving lawyer would unilaterally choose to 
ignore the question of whether he has the lawful right to use inadvertent 
disclosures for his client’s benefit. Even more perplexing is the “ethical 
guidance” that directly follows: “Where a lawyer is not required by applicable 
law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document or delete 
electronically stored information is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily 
reserved to the lawyer.”117 This guidance turns traditional ethical obligations to 
a client’s cause on their head and is precisely backward. 
Crying “enough already,” this Article seeks to clarify that a receiving 
lawyer’s ethical obligation runs to his client when receiving inadvertent 
disclosures. Instead of creating a moral and ethical dilemma between serving (1) 
the client of an opposing lawyer or (2) the receiving lawyer’s client to the fullest 
extent under the law, this Article proposes a bright-line rule that unmistakably 
shines in favor of having each lawyer serve his own client’s interests. This 
Article encourages the adoption of an ethical rule that requires a lawyer to use 
inadvertent disclosures unless prohibited by the rules of evidence, the rules of 
civil procedure, or private agreement. This inadvertent-disclosure proposal 
fairly balances the interests of the justice system, civility in the legal profession, 
and protection of clients. 
E. ABA Formal Opinion 05-437 
In 2005, the path to this Article’s proposal came more clearly into view. In 
response to the adoption of Model Rule 4.4(b), the ABA officially withdrew 
Formal Opinion 92-368 that had severely restricted a receiving lawyer’s options 
when confronted with inadvertent disclosures.118 The Committee recognized 
that Model Rule 4.4(b) had rejected its 1992 opinion and “narrowed the 
obligations of the receiving lawyer.”119 The Committee confessed that Model 
Rule 4.4(b) “only obligates the receiving lawyer to notify the sender of the 
inadvertent transmission promptly” and “does not require the receiving lawyer 
either to refrain from examining the materials or to abide by the instructions of 
the sending lawyer.”120 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (citing Rules 1.2 and 1.4). 
 118. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005) [hereinafter 
Formal Op. 05-437]. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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Even though Model Rule 4.4(b) started moving toward the destination that 
this Article proposes, the Committee tried to cement receiving lawyers from 
using inadvertent disclosures within the bounds of substantive law. Clinging to 
its earlier strictures, the Committee continued its tradition of ignoring rules in 
favor of a “larger, and more fundamental, framework.”121 Formal Opinion 05-
437 invoked the Comments to Model Rule 4.4(b) in a less-than-subtle attempt 
to stifle a lawyer’s use of inadvertent disclosures. It reminded lawyers that 
Comment 2 placed outside of ethics rules the issue of whether the receiving 
lawyer must return inadvertent disclosures or “whether the privileged status of 
a document has been waived.”122 Notwithstanding Model Rule 4.4(b)’s 
liberation from ethical constraints outside of a notification obligation, the 
Committee stressed that a lawyer unilaterally might reapply those shackles.123 
Uninterested in whether the law would allow for the use of inadvertent 
disclosures to benefit a client’s case, the Committee encouraged a receiving 
lawyer to return inadvertent disclosures unread without so much as a courtesy 
call to the lawyer’s client.124 This Article’s proposal ends this intoxicating option 
to forego knowing how the rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure address 
inadvertent disclosures before deciding how to respond ethically, all out of view 
from the client. 
F. ABA Formal Opinion 06-440 
One year later in 2006, the Committee continued to dissemble its earlier 
work by issuing Formal Opinion 06-440 that withdrew Formal Opinion 94-382 
on intentional disclosures.125 It recognized that its earlier opinion “found no 
basis in the Rules for requiring the lawyer to return the materials to their rightful 
owner or even to forbid their use.”126 In a display of contrition, the Committee 
confessed that its 1992 and 1994 opinions were influenced less by ethics rules 
and more “by principles involving the protection of confidentiality, the 
inviolability of the attorney-client privilege, the law governing bailments and 
missent property, and general considerations of common sense, reciprocity, and 
professional courtesy.”127 The Committee confirmed that because Model Rule 
4.4(b) was promulgated, it was improper to rely on law other than ethics rules to 
determine ethical obligations.128 Strictly adhering to the ethics rules, the 
Committee recognized that Model Rule 4.4(b) applies only to inadvertent 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Formal Op. 05-437, supra note 118. 
 124. Id. 
 125. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) [hereinafter 
Formal Op. 06-440]. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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disclosures; not intentional disclosures.129 Given this plain language, the 
Committee opined that a receiving lawyer has no ethical notification obligation 
when it comes to intentional disclosures of confidential or privileged 
materials.130 
G. ABA Formal Opinion 06-442 
Later in 2006, the ABA took another significant step toward placing ethical 
obligations on the sending lawyer rather than the receiving lawyer. In Formal 
Opinion 06-442, the Committee recognized that a sending lawyer was obligated 
to protect confidential or privileged information included in metadata.131 The 
ABA thus displayed an updated understanding that ethical duties focused more 
on the lawyer who controls confidential or privileged information rather than the 
receiving lawyer. Moving further into the age of technological communications, 
Formal Opinion 06-442 addressed metadata, which is “embedded information 
in electronic documents” that is not visible without active effort to reveal it.132 
Following the trend of lifting burdens from the receiving lawyer and placing 
them on the sending lawyer, the Committee opined that the sending lawyer is 
required to scrub metadata from documents before sending them.133 
Far from its opinions in the 1990s, the Committee asked nothing of the 
receiving lawyer who receives embedded information.134 Instead, it freed the 
receiving lawyer to review and use “embedded information in electronic 
documents, whether received from opposing counsel, an adverse party, or an 
agent of an adverse party.”135 Supporting the premise of this Article’s proposal, 
the Committee remarked that Model Rule 4.4(b) should be read as “evidence of 
the intention to set no other specific restrictions on the receiving lawyer’s 
conduct found in other Rules.”136 Logically, a receiving lawyer who has no 
ethical obligations beyond what is required in the rules of ethics should be free 
to pursue all lawful means to aid his client, which would allow a lawyer to use 
the rules of evidence or rules of civil procedure to guide his decision on how to 
use inadvertent disclosures. But unfortunately, that is not as clear as one would 
hope. There still exists an inherently paradoxical message in (1) requiring a 
receiving lawyer to notify opposing counsel of an inadvertent disclosure while 
suggesting that the lawyer may—or even should—feel obligated to self-
administer additional ethical restrains with (2) supposedly “set[ting] no other 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Formal Op. 06-440, supra note 125. 
 131. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) [hereinafter 
Formal Op. 06-442]. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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specific restrictions.”137 Despite the lack of clarity of the next ethical step 
beyond a simple notification obligation, baby step after baby step has brought 
the rules of ethics to the point where the receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations 
relating to inadvertent disclosures are minimal. The next step is for the rules of 
ethics to yield at the intersection of the rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, 
and private agreements. 
H. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) 
The last critical step of 2006 in the journey to address inadvertent 
disclosures was an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A new 
rule regulated the discovery phase of federal litigation and placed obligations on 
a lawyer who receives inadvertent disclosures: 
If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of 
protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify 
any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After 
being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified 
information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until 
the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if 
the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the 
information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. The 
producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.138 
As discussed below, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) plays a central role in this Article’s 
proposal. Even after Model Rule 4.4(b) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B) were adopted, 
however, “litigants continued to seek uniformity in the law in the case of 
inadvertent production.”139 Federal Rule of Evidence 502 sought to fill that void 
of uncertainty. 
I. Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) 
In 2008, a significant stride was made that supports this Article’s proposal 
to tether the rules of ethics to the rules of evidence. After a decades-long 
discussion of the proper response to growing problems of inadvertent 
disclosures and following the path charted two years earlier by Rule 26(b)(5)(B), 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) was enacted: 
When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the 
disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: (1) the 
disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 139. Barkett, supra note 3, at 1594. 
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reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).140 
How these federal rules should interact with Model Rule 4.4(b) will be discussed 
below, but suffice it to say for now that, despite the amount of attention 
inadvertent disclosures has received in the last two decades, the precise duties 
of a lawyer who is caught in this type of situation remain less than clear. With 
the rules of ethics, rules of evidence, and rules of civil procedure now 
converging on a single analytical path, however, the road is paved for this 
Article’s proposal on how best to traverse inadvertent disclosures. 
J. ABA Formal Opinion 11-460 
Before explaining how the rules of civil procedure and rules of evidence 
drive this Article’s proposal, one must understand how the rules of ethics have 
continued to clear the way for this new analytical path for inadvertent 
disclosures. In 2011, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 11-460 that again limited 
the ethical obligations of a receiving lawyer.141 Although not dealing with 
inadvertent disclosures, the opinion is significant because it expressly invoked 
law outside the rules of ethics to guide lawyer conduct: 
When an employer’s lawyer receives copies of an employee’s private 
communications with counsel[,] , . . neither Rule 4.4(b) nor any other Rule 
requires the employer’s lawyer to notify opposing counsel of the receipt of the 
communications. However, court decisions, civil procedure rules, or other law 
may impose such a notification duty . . . .142 
Two pieces of this opinion are relevant to this Article’s proposal. First, Formal 
Opinion 11-460 recognized that ethics rules do not have to govern every issue.143 
Other law like controlling case law and rules of civil procedure could govern 
certain issues that would, in turn, guide a lawyer’s ethical obligations.144 
The second relevant piece lies embedded in a statement about who makes 
decisions in the lawyer-client relationship. According to Formal Opinion 11-
460, when existing law does not provide a clear notification obligation on a 
lawyer, a lawyer should leave the decision to the client rather than allow the 
lawyer to unilaterally choose how to proceed.145 The Committee provided the 
following instruction: 
If no law can reasonably be read as establishing a notification obligation, 
however, then the decision whether to give notice must be made by the 
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employer-client, and the employer’s lawyer must explain the implications of 
disclosure, and the available alternatives, as necessary to enable the employer to 
make an informed decision.146 
This spirit contradicts the Comments to Model Rule 4.4(b) that equip a receiving 
lawyer to bypass a client’s wishes and avoid considering whether the law 
authorizes the use of an inadvertent disclosure of confidential or privileged 
information. This conclusion is a driving principle that guides this Article’s 
proposal since the client’s interest should inform—and not supersede—a 
receiving lawyer’s moral and ethical conviction. 
K. Model Rule 1.6(c) 
In 2012, Model Rule 1.6(c) was amended to require that “[a] lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, 
or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a 
client.”147 As time marched on, the ethical responsibilities relating to inadvertent 
disclosures began to form more properly. The juxtaposition of conflicting 
obligations began to ameliorate. The obligations of a lawyer to protect his 
client’s confidential or privileged information became more focused while a 
receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations to protect the opposing lawyer’s client 
began to wane. 
L. ABA Formal Opinion 17-477 
Well over two decades after the ABA first tried to place the burden to protect 
confidential and privileged information on the lawyer who receives inadvertent 
disclosures, Formal Opinion 17-477 squarely and expressly placed that ethical 
burden on the lawyer who controls that information.148 In taking another step to 
unshackle a receiving lawyer from stiff and inflexible ethical restraints, the ABA 
acknowledged that it is every lawyer’s job to protect his client’s sensitive 
information as opposed to making it anyone or everyone else’s job.149 Going to 
great lengths to discuss a lawyer’s ethical requirements when dealing with client 
matters electronically (which likely entails the entire legal profession), the 
Committee burdened those lawyers—as opposed to a receiving lawyer—to, “on 
a case-by-case basis, constantly analyze how they communicate about client 
matters.”150 
 
 146. Formal Op. 11-460, supra note 141. 
 147. MRPC 1.6(c). 
 148. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 17-477R (2017) 
[hereinafter Formal Op. 17-477R]. 
 149. See id. This trend simply tracks the path forged in 2012 when Model Rule 1.6(c) was 
amended to require that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of 
a client.” MRPC 1.6(c). 
 150. Formal Op. 17-477R, supra note 148 (citing MRPC 1.6(c) com. 18). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
264 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:235 
Recognizing increasing cyber threats and other risks to confidential or 
privileged information, Formal Opinion 17-477 cautioned lawyers who transmit 
client information over the internet to take “reasonable efforts to prevent 
inadvertent or unauthorized access.”151 It also explained that a lawyer “may be 
required to take special security precautions to protect against the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of client information when required by an agreement 
with the client or by law, or when the nature of the information requires a higher 
degree of security.”152 One such reasonable effort is to appropriately label 
privileged and confidential information.153 In turn, these labeling efforts impact 
and trigger Model Rule 4.4(b)’s notification obligation on the receiving 
lawyer.154 
This opinion buttresses this Article’s contention that the obvious trend is to 
place the burden to protect confidential and privileged information on the 
sending lawyer and not on the receiving lawyer. Accounting for the ever-
increasing risks of inadvertent disclosure of a client’s confidential or privileged 
information, the ABA has been moving toward placing clearer and heavier 
burdens on the sending lawyer to safeguard such information and away from 
placing clumsy and strict ethical duties on the receiving lawyer. This movement 
is entirely consistent with this Article’s proposed amendment to Model Rule 
4.4(b). 
M. Time to Complete the Journey on Ethical Obligations on Inadvertent 
Disclosures 
This Article suggests that the Model Rules should stop pulling lawyers in 
conflicting directions that force receiving lawyers to travel a path filled with 
innuendo and subtle head nods. Instead of insinuating that receiving lawyers 
should refrain from using information that might lawfully be used to benefit their 
clients, ethics rules should allow a receiving lawyer—once he meets the basic 
notification obligation—to pursue his client’s interest by using inadvertent 
disclosures unless prohibited by the rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, 
or private agreement. Trying to control inadvertent disclosure issues through 
ethical constraints on the receiving lawyer is like pounding a square peg into a 
round hole. If private agreements, the rules of civil procedure, and the rules of 
evidence authorize the use of inadvertent disclosures (or, on the other hand, 
prohibit such use), then it would be odd for the rules of ethics to attempt to fit 
into the analysis in a way that would misshape the pursuit of truth in the justice 
system. To that end and without further ado, it is time to present the proposal 
and explore why the rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private 
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agreements provide adequate and independent grounds to govern the appropriate 
ethical response to inadvertent disclosure issues. 
III.  WHERE ARE WE GOING: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO MODEL RULE 4.4(B) 
This Article proposes the following clear-eyed modification to Model Rule 
4.4(b): 
A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating 
to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know 
that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent 
shall promptly notify the sender. The receiving lawyer shall use inadvertently 
disclosed documents or information unless prohibited by rules of evidence, rules 
of civil procedure, or private agreement.155 
The simple purpose of this amendment is to redirect a receiving lawyer’s ethical 
decision on how to respond to inadvertent disclosures from the rules of ethics to 
rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private agreements.156 In addition 
to amending Model Rule 4.4(b), Comment 3 should be amended as follows: 
[3] Some lawyers may choose to return a document or delete electronically 
stored information unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving 
it that it was inadvertently sent. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable 
law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document or delete 
electronically stored information is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily 
reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4. 
[3] As the risk of inadvertent disclosures has grown exponentially and the costs 
associated with discovery have ballooned, lawyers have been inundated with 
unclear ethical guidance on inadvertent disclosures. Rule 4.4(b) clarifies that a 
lawyer who receives inadvertent disclosures has a notification obligation only. 
Once a lawyer satisfies his or her notification obligation, the receiving lawyer’s 
subsequent ethical obligations are governed by (a) private agreement between 
 
 155. Now is as good a time as any to point out that this proposed rule could be interpreted in a 
way that applies only to litigation. That would be an unfortunate interpretation, because this 
proposal governs all inadvertent disclosures, whether in transactional matters or in litigation. When 
it comes to litigation, the ethical obligations of lawyers would be driven by rules of evidence, rules 
of civil procedure, or private agreement. When addressing inadvertent disclosures outside of 
litigation—in various transactions or negotiations, for example—then the rules of evidence and 
rules of civil procedure are not as readily available unless and until litigation results. In these 
scenarios, inadvertent disclosures could be governed by private agreement. 
 156. One must not separate the purpose behind a rule from the rule itself. Lucas, supra note 71, 
at 441–42 (“Legal principles are not independent islands that we visit for resolution of disputes. 
Instead, they form the fabric of our society, and they are only as good as the purposes they serve.”). 
If a rule serves no purpose, then why have a rule? That philosophy drives this proposal; a rule of 
ethics is only as good as the purpose it serves. When it comes to inadvertent disclosures, the 
purposes behind the rules of civil procedure and rules of evidence undergird the purposes behind 
any rule of ethics. Thus, they should align properly. 
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lawyer and client, (b) private agreement between opposing lawyers, (c) the 
governing rules of civil procedure, or (d) the governing rules of evidence.157 
Under the modified rule and comment, ethics rules will no longer be burdened 
to find the single most appropriate solution to inadvertent disclosures. Instead, 
ethics rules will liberate a receiving lawyer to think through inadvertent 
disclosure issues by asking whether other law authorizes—or prohibits—such 
use. 
Here is the basic approach. First, a lawyer may enter a private agreement 
with his client to forego any use of inadvertent disclosures. This agreement 
would follow strict ethical constraints that protect privileged and confidential 
information. Perhaps characterized as the “there but by the grace of God go I 
option,” a private agreement unilaterally disarms the receiving lawyer from 
using inadvertent disclosures for his client’s benefit regardless of whether the 
rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure would authorize such use. To select 
this option, a lawyer must get the informed consent of his client.158 
 
 157. Although it does not form the basis of this proposal, the Association of the Bar of the City 
of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics issued a helpful opinion in late 2003 
that sought the proper balance among competing interests when confronting inadvertent 
disclosures. N.Y. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, supra note 2. It sought a rule that 
“best harmonizes the Code’s concerns for the administration of justice, client confidences and 
secrets, and zealous representation.” Id. In a nutshell, its approach required the receiving lawyer to 
“promptly notify the sender and refrain from further reading or listening to the communication” 
and generally follow the sending lawyer’s instructions. Id. But the Committee was unwilling to 
allow the sending lawyer to control the potential use of the information by creating a safety-valve 
exception to a bright-line rule prohibiting the receiving lawyer from using the inadvertent 
disclosure: “if there is a legal dispute before a tribunal and the receiving attorney believes in good 
faith that the communication appropriately may be retained and used, the receiving attorney may 
submit the communication for in camera consideration by the tribunal as to its disposition.” Id. The 
Committee took great pains to stress that “it is essential—as an ethical matter—that the receiving 
attorney promptly notify the sending attorney of the disclosure in order to give the sending attorney 
a reasonable opportunity to promptly take whatever steps he or she feels are necessary.” Id. This 
approach provides far more useful guidance than the current Comments to Model Rule 4.4(b). 
Finally, the opinion recognized what is hiding in plain sight: “Although ethical rules may not 
preclude use, governing law, rules of evidence, or other principles may limit or preclude use.” N.Y. 
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, supra note 2. 
 158. Employing one-part humor and one-part sarcasm, a legal ethics scholar suggested that 
lawyers could use the following language in these types of private agreements with their clients: 
In the course of representing you, I might realize that the lawyer representing your 
adversary has made a mistake that might help you to achieve your lawful goal. If that should 
happen, I might decide to correct or not to take advantage of the adversary lawyer’s mistake. 
I will do that even if (a) it would be lawful for me to take advantage of the mistake; (b) it 
would materially prejudice your interests if I correct the mistake; and (c) you told me that I 
should take advantage of the mistake. I might also decide simply to keep you in ignorance 
of the other lawyer’s mistake. 
Freedman, supra note 17, at 180. 
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Second, and along the lines of the first option, opposing lawyers have the 
option to enter a private agreement that requires that both lawyers forego any 
use of inadvertent disclosures. This approach balances the burdens and benefits 
associated with inadvertent disclosures. On the one hand, a lawyer is contracting 
away the possible benefits to his client to use inadvertent disclosures while on 
the other hand, the possible burdens of his own inadvertent disclosures will not 
harm the client. To select this option, both lawyers would need the informed 
consent of their respective clients. 
Third, if lawyers do not address the issue of inadvertent disclosures through 
private agreement, then they must look to the rules of evidence and rules of civil 
procedure to determine the appropriate ethical response. To adequately 
understand what this will look like practically, one must have an understanding 
of how these default rules govern inadvertent disclosures. 
IV.  HOW DO WE GET THERE: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS 
ON INADVERTENT DISCLOSURES SHOULD ALIGN WITH THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND PRIVATE AGREEMENTS 
The working premise behind this Article’s proposal is that the rules of 
evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private agreements more justly address 
the proper ethical response to inadvertent disclosures than any one-size-fits-all 
rule of ethics. It is important to recognize that the proposal takes the rules of 
evidence and rules of civil procedure as they are; it is agnostic on how these 
litigation rules should govern inadvertent disclosures. For ease of reference and 
analysis, this Article focuses on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. Be assured, however, that the following analysis has 
uniform application no matter how a jurisdiction addresses inadvertent 
disclosures through its litigation rules. 
A. Inadvertent Disclosures under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Because the challenges faced by inadvertent disclosures were nearly fully 
formed by 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended. In 
addressing inadvertent disclosures in federal litigation, the Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Civil Procedure explained that it had “repeatedly been advised 
that the risk of privilege waiver, and the work necessary to avoid it, add to the 
costs and delay of discovery.”159 The Committee recognized that in the digital 
 
 159. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment; see also EDWARD 
J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 
6.12.5 (3d ed., 2018) (“At one of the Advisory Committee public hearings on proposed Rule 502, 
‘representatives from Verizon testified . . . that the company had spent $13.5 million on one 
privilege review relating to a U.S. Department of Justice antitrust investigation.”) (citing Alvin F. 
Lindsay, New Rule 502 to Protect Against Privilege Waiver, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 25, 2008, at S2); 
Schaefer, supra note 2, at 200 (“When attorneys are charged with handling [digital] information 
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age, “the risk of waiver, and the time and effort required to avoid it, can increase 
substantially” given the sheer volume of information.160 In response to this 
burgeoning problem, Rule 26(b)(5) was crafted on “Claiming Privilege or 
Protecting Trial-Preparation Materials.”161 Relevant here, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) 
created explicit mechanisms for lawyers who are engaged in federal litigation to 
contemplate and address inadvertent disclosures of privileged information:  
If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of 
protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify 
any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After 
being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified 
information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until 
the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if 
the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the 
information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. The 
producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.162 
Rule 26(b)(5) provides the default rule on how lawyers may respond when 
confronted with inadvertent disclosures during federal litigation. The comments 
to Rule 26(b)(5)(B) clarify that the procedural rule “does not address whether 
the privilege or protection that is asserted after production was waived by the 
production.”163 Instead, courts will “determine whether, and under what 
circumstances, waiver results from inadvertent production of privileged or 
protected information.”164 Rule 26(b)(5)(B) simply provides a clear and helpful 
“procedure for presenting and addressing these issues.”165 
In essence, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offer two basic mechanisms 
that regulate inadvertent disclosures. The first mechanism creates default rules 
upon which lawyers may rely when confronted with inadvertent disclosures 
 
for their clients, it is now more difficult than ever to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of 
confidential information,” which is “a substantial risk faced by every practicing attorney regardless 
of the care taken to prevent it” and “strikes fear and sometimes pain in the hearts of attorneys.”). 
 160. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment; see also Barkett, 
supra note 3, at 1589 (“The inadvertent production of privileged or work-product protected 
documents is a genuine risk in litigation today because of the magnitude of electronically stored 
information (ESI) and the electronic transmission habits of individuals who send and receive 
privileged communications”); Schaefer, supra note 2, at 195 (“With high-speed communication 
and a staggering volume of electronically stored information, the risks of inadvertent disclosure are 
greater today than ever before.”). 
 161. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
 162. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 163. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 164. Id. An expert in E-Discovery and member of the Advisory Committee for Civil Rules of 
the Federal Judicial Conference explained it this way: “The Rule, by design, stays out of the battle 
of whether the producing party’s delay in giving notice results in a waiver of the privilege or 
protection.” Barkett, supra note 3, at 1593. 
 165. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
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during litigation. The second mechanism allows lawyers to opt out of those 
default procedural rules on inadvertent disclosures through private agreements 
and scheduling orders before any issues of inadvertent disclosures arise during 
litigation. The following paragraphs introduce both options in the context of how 
they support this Article’s proposed ethics rule. 
1. Default Mechanism for Inadvertent Disclosures Made during 
Litigation 
Even though Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides a crystal-clear mechanism to follow 
when inadvertent disclosures occur during discovery, the comments provide a 
step-by-step guide for lawyers.166 Initially, a lawyer who believes that privileged 
information has been inadvertently disclosed must notify the receiving 
lawyer.167 In response, the receiving lawyer “must promptly return, sequester, 
or destroy the information and any copies it has.”168 The receiving lawyer then 
“must decide whether to challenge the claim and may sequester the information 
and submit it to the court for a ruling on whether the claimed privilege or 
protection applies and whether it has been waived.”169 The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure anticipate that courts will make a “waiver determination under 
the governing law.”170 While the court is considering the privilege claim, the 
receiving lawyer must not use or disclose the inadvertently disclosed 
information.171 If the receiving lawyer seeks to use inadvertent disclosures, the 
lawyer may challenge any claim that the inadvertently disclosed information has 
retained its privileged status.172 
If this Article’s proposal is adopted, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) will guide a receiving 
lawyer’s ethical response to inadvertent disclosures and move any contested 
issue toward efficient resolution. Under Rule 26(b)(5)(B), the receiving lawyer 
labors under no notification obligation; that obligation is heaped upon the 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. The high volume of discoverable materials in litigation contributes to rising legal costs 
and higher risks that privileged information will be inadvertently disclosed. S. REP. NO. 110-264, 
at 1-3 (2008). Rule 26(b)(5)(B) works with Federal Rule of Evidence 502 in attempting to limit 
“the consequences of inadvertent disclosure, thereby relieving litigants of the burden that a single 
mistake during the discovery process can cost them the protection of a privilege.” Id. While Rule 
26(b)(5)(B) places the notification obligation on the sending lawyer, Model Rule 4.4(b) actually 
promotes and supports these goals by requiring a receiving lawyer to notify an opposing lawyer 
when he receives inadvertently disclosed material. An ethical notification obligation jumpstarts the 
protections afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to adequately address inadvertent 
disclosures. 
 168. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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sending lawyer.173 Model Rule 4.4(b) contains a glaring difference in that it 
foists upon the receiving lawyer a notification obligation once that lawyer 
reasonably believes that he possesses inadvertently disclosed documents that 
contain privileged information.174 This Article’s proposal wholeheartedly 
supports the notification obligation that Model Rule 4.4(b) places on the 
receiving lawyer as a matter of professional courtesy and transparency. By 
placing an ethical notification obligation on the receiving lawyer, the rules of 
ethics ultimately aid the rules of procedure by getting the ball rolling toward a 
resolution of inadvertent disclosures.175 If the rules of ethics look to the rules of 
evidence and rules of civil procedure, the receiving lawyer’s ethical notification 
obligation should trigger the sending lawyer’s duty to guard against waiver 
caused by the inadvertent disclosure by promptly taking “reasonable steps to 
rectify the error.”176 Such steps include seeking the protections afforded by the 
rules of civil procedure and rules of evidence. Working together, those rules 
provide the prudent protocol to resolve fully and fairly the legal issue of whether 
a receiving lawyer may use inadvertent disclosures. This is exactly the procedure 
that a receiving lawyer should understand when deciding how to proceed under 
his ethical obligations. Any effort by a receiving lawyer’s misplaced sense of 
ethics to highjack the legal benefits afforded by the rules of civil procedure 
working in concert with the rules of evidence would collapse the very purposes 
that undergird those rules. 
Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “should be construed, 
administered, and employed . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”177 The Federal Rules of 
Evidence in turn work closely with procedural rules to ensure that the adversarial 
process functions effectively to ensure “the orderly presentation of facts and 
arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit 
evidence to contradict or explain the opponent’s case.”178 There exists a strong 
governmental “interest in the orderly conduct of [trials that should be] sufficient 
to justify the imposition and enforcement of firm, though not always inflexible, 
rules relating to the identification and presentation of evidence.”179 When these 
 
 173. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 174. See MRPC 4.4(b); see also, Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod. Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 
128 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (recognizing that Rule 26(b)(5)(B) does not impose any duty on the 
receiving party unless and until the sending party notifies the receiving lawyer of a privilege claim). 
 175. It is true that not all state rules of ethics, rules of procedure, and rules of evidence are 
uniform. To the extent that a rule of ethics diverges from Model Rule 4.4(b) by not placing a 
notification obligation on the receiving lawyer, then there might not be a notification obligation on 
a receiving lawyer at all. See Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 131. 
 176. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
 177. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 178. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411 (1988). 
 179. See id. 
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rules are carefully tailored to promote fair, just, and efficient administration of 
justice, it would be odd for ethical obligations to run contrary to them. No set of 
ethics rules or misunderstanding of one’s ethical obligations should place 
barricades that block the use of otherwise useable inadvertent disclosures. 
This Article’s proposal contends that the rules of ethics should yield at this 
intersection of the rules of procedure and the rules of evidence. Working in 
tandem, these two bodies of law sufficiently and justly resolve inadvertent 
disclosure issues. There is no reason for the rules of ethics to impede a lawyer’s 
ability to use the rules of civil procedure and rules of evidence to seek a “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of inadvertent disclosure issues. Now is 
the time to align the rules of ethics with the default rules of civil procedure and 
rules of evidence. 
2. Alternate Mechanism for Private Agreements 
The second option under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure frees lawyers 
from using default evidentiary and procedural rules to resolve competing claims 
over inadvertent disclosures. This option allows lawyers to agree on how to 
address inadvertent disclosures in federal litigation. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) works in 
tandem with the Federal Rules of Evidence to provide the default rules on how 
lawyers and courts will decide inadvertent disclosure issues. But lawyers do not 
have to employ those default rules; they may opt out through private agreements 
that create scheduling orders to govern inadvertent disclosures.180 By opting out 
of default rules, lawyers eliminate the uncertainty, delay, and cost embedded in 
litigating privilege issues.181 If lawyers wish to opt out of Rule 26(b)(5)(B) to 
resolve privilege issues in scheduling orders, they simply must follow Rules 
26(f) and 16(b). Scheduling orders will normally control the privilege issue if 
they differ from how Rule 26(b)(5)(B) would resolve the issue.182  
At the same time that Rule 26(b)(5)(B) was adopted, Rule 26(f) was 
“amended to direct the parties to discuss privilege issues in preparing their 
discovery plan, and which, with amended Rule 16(b), allows the parties to ask 
the court to include in an order any agreements the parties reach regarding issues 
of privilege or trial-preparation material protection.”183 Rule 26(f)(2) requires 
that parties consider a discovery plan and submit it to the court for approval.184 
 
 180. See, e.g., Barkett, supra note 3, at 1617 (encouraging lawyers to seek “a thoroughly drawn 
Rule 502(d) order [to] disclaim the application of Rule 502(b), and instead identify the order as the 
sole vehicle under which the availability of the privilege should be evaluated” and “declare that 
any production of a privileged or work-product protected document is inadvertent”). 
 181. See, e.g., id. at 1593 (“Some litigants seek to eliminate the risk of waiver or reduce the 
cost of a privilege review by entering into nonwaiver agreements by stipulation or through a court 
order.”). 
 182. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 183. Id. 
 184. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
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Critical here, Rule 26(f)(3)(D) allows lawyers to tackle inadvertent disclosure 
issues by agreeing how to address “claims of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation materials, including . . . whether to ask the court to include their 
agreement in an order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502.”185 Once lawyers 
enter private agreements on how they would like to address inadvertent 
disclosures, Rule 26(f) then works with Rule 16 to create controlling scheduling 
orders. 
Rule 16(a) utilizes pretrial conferences to explore ways to expedite 
resolution of disputes, avoid protracted litigation due to poor case management, 
and discourage “wasteful pretrial activities.”186 Rule 16(b) provides the 
controlling mechanism to further these goals—the scheduling order.187 Relevant 
here, Rule 16(b)(3)(B)(iv) permits lawyers to include in the scheduling order 
“any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of 
protection as trial-preparation material after information is produced, including 
agreements reached under Federal Rule of Evidence 502.”188 
Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate that lawyers may wish 
to opt out of default procedural and evidentiary rules through private agreements 
to regulate inadvertent disclosures. This opt-out prospect that is embedded in the 
rules of civil procedure reinforces this Article’s proposal to modify the rules of 
 
 185. Id. at (f)(3)(D). It is important to at least note that when a lawyer attempts to use private 
agreements to opt out of default rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure, the lawyer must 
understand the scope of those agreements and to whom they control. Addressing the “Controlling 
Effect of a Party Agreement,” Federal Rule of Evidence 502(e) elucidates how any “agreement on 
the effect of disclosure in a federal proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, 
unless it is incorporated into a court order.” FED. R. EVID. 502(e). The Advisory Committee’s 
Explanatory Note makes clear that this “well-established proposition” authorizes parties to enter 
into a private “agreement to limit the effect of waiver by disclosure between or among them.” FED. 
R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment. Recognizing that because “such 
an agreement can bind only the parties to the agreement,” Rule 502(e) “makes clear that if parties 
want protection against non-parties from a finding of waiver by disclosure, the agreement must be 
made part of a court order.” Id. One expert in federal litigation provides this helpful illustration on 
an efficient way to safeguard privileged information against inadvertent disclosures by utilizing the 
rules of ethics, the rules of civil procedure, and the rules of evidence: 
  Let me offer this illustration of the interplay of these various rules. If a lawyer receives 
an inadvertently produced privileged document, under Model Rule 4.4(b), the lawyer 
should “promptly” notify the sender. If the sender discovers the inadvertent production first 
in a federal proceeding, FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) should result in notice and resolution of the 
claim of waiver by the district court. Rule 502(b) would then provide a uniform rule of law 
to determine if a waiver has occurred. Parties that wish to address the potential of 
inadvertent production upfront should ask the district court to enter a Rule 502(d) order to 
protect the parties from claims of privilege waiver by parties within the litigation or by third 
parties. 
Barkett, supra note 3, at 1598–99. 
 186. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(1)-(3). 
 187. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
 188. Id. at 16(b)(3)(B)(iv). 
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ethics to allow lawyers to enter private agreements to control inadvertent 
disclosures if the lawyers are not content to be bound by the default rules of civil 
procedure and rules of evidence. By aligning the rules of ethics with the rules of 
civil procedure and allowing opposing lawyers to enter private agreements on 
inadvertent disclosures with informed consent from their respective clients, 
every point of view on the proper ethical response to inadvertent disclosures 
should be satisfied.189 No matter if one’s position is that the rules of ethics should 
prohibit a lawyer from using inadvertent disclosures, such a position would 
enjoy a fair opportunity to be adopted by individual lawyers through private 
agreements. Harkening back to the reasons that Formal Opinion 92-368 gave to 
place strict ethical restrictions on a receiving lawyer, those abstract reasons for 
non-use may find an audience in lawyers who choose to enter private agreements 
that place restrictions on the use of inadvertent disclosures. Additionally, the 
current Comments to Rule 4.4(b) that encourage lawyers to forego any use of 
inadvertent disclosures can be directed toward lawyers as they ponder whether 
to utilize the ethical and procedural private-agreement option. At bottom, any 
ethical stricture would yield to ethical choice. 
Finally, the private-agreement option should be particularly enticing to 
lawyers who feel a moral calling not to use the mistakes of another lawyer. 
Through opting out of any default substantive rule that would allow such use, 
the lawyer would not be tempted to forego heeding the direction mandated by 
his ethical compass. For any lawyer who does not wish to opt out of the default 
rules of civil procedure and rules of evidence through private agreement, 
however, it would be mandatory that a lawyer fully understand how the rules of 
civil procedure interact with the rules of evidence to resolve inadvertent 
disclosure issues.  
B. Inadvertent Disclosures under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Under this Article’s proposal, the rules of evidence play a central role in 
determining the ethical obligations of a lawyer who receives an inadvertent 
disclosure.190 The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is “to administer 
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote 
the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and 
 
 189. One California court boldly proclaimed, “We believe a client should not enter the attorney-
client relationship fearful that an inadvertent error by its counsel could result in the waiver of 
privileged information or the retention of the privileged information by an adversary who might 
abuse and disseminate the information with impunity.” State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 799, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Private agreements should ameliorate a client’s fears. 
 190. A big-firm commercial litigator and expert on e-Discovery has argued that “Federal Rule 
of Evidence 502(d) plays an important role . . . [in] solving the privilege-protection puzzle.” 
Barkett, supra note 3, at 1590; see also, Schaefer, supra note 2, at 213 (“The law of privilege waiver 
is the key doctrine used to address the consequences of inadvertent disclosure.”). 
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securing a just determination.”191 At their core, these rules seek to ensure that 
evidence is trustworthy.192 The working premise of this Article is that if the rules 
of evidence proffer that inadvertent disclosures are trustworthy and fairly serve 
to ascertain truth and secure just determinations, it would be a perversion of 
justice if an overactive set of ethics rules worked against those goals.193 If the 
rules of evidence authorize the use of inadvertent disclosures, that authorization 
should inform the proper ethical response. On the other hand, if the rules of 
evidence preclude the use of inadvertent disclosures, then that restriction, too, 
should counsel—and bind—a lawyer’s ethical obligation. That result would not 
be any more or less restrictive than restrictions that ethics rules and ethics 
opinions have placed on receiving lawyers without properly considering how the 
rules of evidence address the issue. This Article’s proposal explicitly obligates 
a receiving lawyer to understand fully how the rules of evidence govern 
inadvertent disclosures before knowing how to meet the ethical obligations to 
his client. 
To be clear, every lawyer must have a thorough understanding of the rules 
of evidence to meet his ethical obligations when confronted with inadvertent 
disclosures in litigation. A receiving lawyer’s ethical decision to use or not to 
use inadvertent disclosures for his client’s benefit boils down to whether the 
rules of evidence authorize such use. When the rules of evidence authorize the 
use of inadvertently disclosed information, then only a private agreement (with 
the client’s informed consent) would authorize the lawyer to not use the 
information for his client’s benefit and still meet his ethical obligations. 
For ease of discussion and reference, instead of analyzing the rules of 
evidence of a multitude of jurisdictions, this Article will look to the federal rules 
to illustrate how the proposal will work. But again, this proposal works with any 
 
 191. FED. R. EVID. 102. In addressing a privilege issue other than that of attorney-client, one 
court recognized that an essential public interest seeks “the fair administration of justice,” which 
“is embodied in the core provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence whose purpose it is to develop 
all relevant facts at trial.” Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576, 579 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (addressing the 
admissibility of evidence from psychiatric counseling under the physician-patient privilege). 
 192. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973). 
 193. See, e.g., Opinion #146. Obligation to Return Inadvertently Disclosed Privileged 
Documents, BD. OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS COMMISSION (Dec. 9, 1994), 
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=696513 [https://perma.cc/Z97 
H-GB4B]. (“So long as use of the [inadvertently disclosed] memorandum is permitted by the Rules 
of Evidence or Procedure, use of the memorandum cannot be said to be prejudicial to our adversary 
system of litigation.”). “The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both 
fundamental and comprehensive.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). “The very 
integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all 
the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.” Id. It cannot be overstated that an ethical 
restriction on the use of inadvertent disclosures that otherwise are admissible would fundamentally 
undermine the integrity of our adversarial judicial system, which, over time, would erode public 
confidence. 
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variation of how rules of evidence regulate inadvertent disclosure issues. 
Currently, Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) employs a three-step negligence 
analysis to determine whether inadvertently disclosed information results in the 
loss of the attorney-client privilege: 
When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the 
disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: (1) the 
disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took 
reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).194 
This test creates a presumption in favor of the return of inadvertently disclosed 
information.195 The Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Note explains that Rule 
502 “has two major purposes.”196 First, it resolves longstanding splits in 
authority in various courts on how inadvertent disclosure impacts waiver of 
privilege.197 Second, building on the findings that prompted the promulgation of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), Rule 502 tries to correct a “widespread 
complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of attorney-
client privilege or work product” through inadvertent disclosures “have become 
prohibitive.”198 Lawyers have legitimate concerns that any disclosure—no 
matter how innocent or minimal—will operate as a subject matter waiver of all 
 
 194. FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 195. IRS CCN CC-2009-023, 2009 WL 2486470. 
 196. FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment. 
 197. Id.; see also 154 CONG. REC. H7818 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of congressional 
intent regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence) (explaining that the chosen standard 
simply follows “the majority rule in the federal courts”). 
 198. FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment; see also, IRS CCN 
CC-2009-023, 2009 WL 2486470 (“The stated objective for the adoption of Rule 502 is to alleviate 
some of the costs associated with electronic discovery and document production in litigation by 
reducing the risks associated with inadvertent production of material protected by the attorney-
client privilege or the work product doctrine.”); Laurie A. Weiss, Protection of Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Work Product in the E-Discovery Era, in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN 
CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 163 (Vincent S. Walkowiak 
ed., 4th ed. 2008) (“In drafting the proposed Rule, the Advisory Committee concluded that the 
current law on waiver of privilege and work product is responsible in large part for the rising costs 
of discovery, especially discovery of electronic information. In complex litigation the lawyers 
spend significant amounts of time and effort to preserve the privilege and work product.”); Hopson 
v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 239 (D. Md. 2005) (“Responding to a 
discovery request for a corporation’s internal e-mail may seem simple and straightforward to the 
courts or lawyers. However, a company served with a request to produce e-mail messages faces 
time consuming and expensive processes. . . . The cost of responding to a discovery request can be 
in the millions of dollars. . .”) (quoting Linda Volonino, Electronic Evidence and Computer 
Forensics, 12 COMMC’NS OF THE ASS’N FOR INFO. SYS. 27, October 2003, at 14, available at 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol12/iss1/27/ [https://perma.cc/4YL8-WBF8]). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
276 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:235 
protected communications or information. This concern is especially acute in 
cases involving large amounts of electronic discovery.199 
Before Rule 502(b) was promulgated, the law’s treatment of inadvertent 
disclosures was not uniform.200 Typically, courts employed one of three tests to 
decide whether an inadvertent disclosure waived the attorney-client privilege.201 
At one end of the spectrum, some courts followed a strict no-waiver approach, 
deciding that true inadvertence does not constitute waiver.202 At the opposite end 
of the spectrum, a few courts followed an always-waived approach, concluding 
that disclosure, by definition, waived privilege.203 As often happens in the law, 
 
 199. See, e.g., Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 244 (recognizing that because electronic discovery “may 
encompass hundreds of thousands, if not millions of electronic records, that are potentially 
discoverable,” a “record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain of subject matter 
waiver, would impose upon parties costs of production that bear no proportionality to what is at 
stake in the litigation”). Everyone was not enamored with Rule 502: 
  We can state the policy of Rule 502 succinctly, albeit simplistically, as “special waiver 
rules for the wealthy.” Corporate lawyers and corporate-funded Congressmen originally 
pushed the Judicial Conference to draft the bill. People of modest means do not make so 
many communications to attorneys that they need to do extensive screening to make sure 
that they do not mistakenly turn over privileged information in discovery. Nor do they 
engage in so much litigation that they must worry about the effect of the disclosures in one 
lawsuit in some subsequent lawsuit. Only corporations and the filthy rich face the problems 
that Rule 502 claims to fix. 
23A ANN MURPHY, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5442 (1st ed., 2018); see also, 
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 159, at § 6.12.5 (remarking that “some commentators have dubbed 
[Federal Rule of Evidence 502] the Lawyers’ Relief from Mistakes Rule”) (citing Jerold S. Solovy 
& Robert L. Byman, Discovery: Mistakes Happen, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 19, 2009, at 14). 
 200. See FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment (“Courts are in 
conflict over whether an inadvertent disclosure of a communication or information protected as 
privileged or work product constitutes a waiver.”). Rule 502’s approach to waiver issues serves to 
“provide a predictable, uniform set of standards.” FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 
2008 amendment. See also, 154 CONG. REC. H7818 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of 
congressional intent regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence) (“The majority rule in 
the federal courts has simply been distilled here into a standard designed to be predictable in its 
application.”). 
 201. “The first approach is called the traditional or strict approach, which holds that an 
inadvertent disclosure always constitutes a waiver of privilege.” Jones v. Eagle-North Hills 
Shopping Centre L.P., 239 F.R.D. 684, 685 (E.D. Okla. 2007). “The second approach is the ‘no 
waiver’ approach or ‘subjective intent test,’” which “holds that an inadvertent disclosure does not 
constitute a waiver of privilege without extreme negligence.” Id. “The third approach is referred to 
as the ‘skeptical balancing test,’ which gives the court discretion in determining whether the 
inadvertent disclosure results in a waiver” with full awareness “that, in spite of many peoples’ 
thoughts otherwise, even lawyers are human and are capable of making mistakes.” Id. 
 202. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment. 
 203. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment (“[A] few courts hold 
that any inadvertent disclosure of a communication or information protected under the attorney-
client privilege or as work product constitutes a waiver without regard to the protections taken to 
avoid such a disclosure.”). 
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a third path was forged in the middle. Courts that followed this middle path 
employed a negligence test that balanced various factors to determine if the 
privilege had been waived.204 When employing the negligence or balancing test, 
most courts employed these five factors: (1) the reasonableness of the 
precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the number of 
inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures; (4) any delay in 
measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5) overriding interests in justice.205 
Under this third option, courts employ a two-part analytical framework when 
considering privilege issues involving inadvertent disclosures.206 The first part 
analyzes Rule 502(b)’s three-step negligence test: (1) whether the disclosure was 
inadvertent; (2) whether reasonable steps were taken to prevent disclosure; and 
(3) whether reasonable steps were taken to rectify the error after disclosure.207 
The second part recognizes that in order to analyze the reasonableness aspects 
of Rule 502(b)(2) and (3), one must apply the five-factor test.208 It is important 
to note that this balancing test is not highly calibrated. None of these factors is 
dispositive; they simply serve as non-determinative guidelines to flexibly test 
the reasonableness of a lawyer’s conduct within the overriding value of 
fairness.209 
Perhaps surprisingly, this Article has no interest in critiquing the wisdom of 
how the rules of evidence—whether the federal rules or rules in various state 
 
 204. Rule 502 “opts for the middle ground: inadvertent disclosure of protected communications 
or information in connection with a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency does not 
constitute a waiver if the holder took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and also promptly took 
reasonable steps to rectify the error.” FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 
amendment. Indeed, this test follows “the majority view on whether inadvertent disclosure is a 
waiver.” Id. (“Most courts find a waiver only if the disclosing party acted carelessly in disclosing 
the communication or information and failed to request its return in a timely manner.”). 
 205. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment. See, e.g., Lois 
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Judge Joyner’s opinion in Fidelity 
& Deposit Co. of Maryland v. McCulloch, 168 F.R.D. 516 (E.D.Pa.1996), is widely cited as setting 
the appropriate factors under the negligence test used to determine whether an inadvertent 
disclosure results in the loss of the attorney-client privilege: 
(1)  The reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view 
of the extent of the document production. 
(2) The number of inadvertent disclosures. 
(3) The extent of the disclosure. 
(4) Any delay and measures taken to rectify the disclosure. 
(5) Whether the overriding interests of justice would or would not be served by relieving 
the party of its errors. 
Id. at 521–22. 
 206. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment. 
 207. Id. (italics added). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
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jurisdictions—choose to resolve privilege issues when confronted with 
inadvertent disclosures. That battle has raged for decades and probably will 
continue to do so in the fifty-one federal and state systems. How various rules 
of evidence address the inadvertent disclosure issue is wholly irrelevant. This 
Article’s proposed rule of ethics is content to take the rules of evidence and rules 
of procedure as they are—and even as they will be over time—because those 
rules should govern ethical responses; not the other way around. At this stage, 
perhaps it is prudent to illustrate how tethering the rules of ethics to the rules of 
evidence will work in practice. 
C. Practical Illustrations of Amended Model Rule 4.4(b)’s Interaction with 
Rules of Evidence 
If a receiving lawyer were to forego private agreements to limit use of 
inadvertent disclosures, then an understanding of the rules of evidence is 
necessary. This Article highlights how aligning the rules of ethics with the rules 
of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private agreements is the best path 
forward. It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve deeply into each area, 
because the wisdom of the proposal does not rely on the types of rules of 
evidence or rules of civil procedure that lawyers might confront. Instead, the 
proposal’s bright-line rule works no matter the state of evidentiary or procedural 
rules on inadvertent disclosures. Lawyers must take those rules as they come 
when deciding the appropriate ethical response to inadvertent disclosures. 
Additionally, the private agreement option always stands ready to assist lawyers 
whose ethical values might not be consistent with rules of evidence and rules of 
civil procedure.210 Although inadvertent disclosure cases will span a wide 
spectrum of potential results under this Article’s proposal, an analysis of a few 
scenarios should offer a sense of the practical reality in litigation. 
1. Never-Waived Approach 
If a jurisdiction followed a strict no-waiver approach when confronting 
inadvertent disclosures, the ethical response under the updated Model Rule 
4.4(b) would be straightforward—the receiving lawyer would not be authorized 
to use the disclosed information. It might be wise to draw an important 
distinction between merely possessing privileged materials and actually 
attempting to use them. Because the rules of evidence govern the use and 
admissibility of evidence, the receiving lawyer’s desire to use privileged 
information would be rendered moot if that information retains its coveted 
privileged status. Without the ability to use privileged information, there would 
not be much benefit for a receiving lawyer to possess it.  
 
 210. Given the inherent uncertainty in privilege litigation—and its inordinate cost—one readily 
can see why many lawyers might choose the private agreement option to settle inadvertent 
disclosure issues before they become expensive to litigate. 
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One pre-Rule 502(b) case revealed how a court disavowed the traditional 
balancing test in favor of a never-waived approach. In Jones v. Eagle-North Hills 
Shopping Centre,211 a lawyer inadvertently sent a privileged email to opposing 
counsel in litigation.212 Within eight minutes, the sending lawyer realized his 
mistake and immediately asked opposing counsel to delete the email.213 
Displaying the opposite of a charitably cheery disposition, the receiving lawyer 
let the sending lawyer know that it was “too late,” because she had already read 
the short email.214 This is where it is important to recognize that simply reading 
the email versus using its contents to benefit a client are not the same thing. 
Without the guidance of Rule 502(b), the court acknowledged the three 
primary approaches that determine whether an inadvertent disclosure waives the 
attorney-client privilege.215 The court had to choose to apply the always-waived 
approach, the never-waived approach, or the negligence approach (often called 
the “skeptical balancing test”).216 The court refused to follow the strict always-
waived approach, believing “that privileges are to be taken quite seriously” and 
“should not, therefore, be blithely disregarded.”217 The court also rejected the 
balancing test, complaining that “the benefit of flexibility is often overshadowed 
by the cost of uncertainty.”218 Left with one remaining option, the court adopted 
the never-waived approach “based on the idea that a waiver when the client is 
 
 211. 239 F.R.D. 684 (E.D. Okla. 2007). 
 212. Id. at 685. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. 239 F.R.D. at 685. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. Undoubtedly, multi-factor balancing tests can lead to uncertainty in outcome, which 
leads to enthusiasm for rules that promote uniformity and certainty. This Article’s proposed ethics 
rule would in no way contribute to that uncertainty, because it takes other rules as they come. One 
author, however, has complained that the lack of uniformity in federal litigation when it comes to 
inadvertent disclosures is troubling: 
  Recent Rule 502(b) case law . . . demonstrates a stubborn adherence to former, not 
uniform case law as part of the application of a rule that was intended to create 
uniformity. . . [S]ome courts have entered a time warp—as if e-discovery were nonexistent. 
A major goal of Rule 502 is to decrease litigation costs. This means looking at the data 
storage world we face today and eschewing reliance on cases decided in a different era that 
do not account for the costs of restoration, retrieval, and review of electronically stored 
information. Court orders need to encourage the use of technology in smart ways that may 
not be 100 percent privilege protective, meaning that these court orders must protect the 
privilege in meaningful ways to avoid stifling the benefits technology can provide to 
reducing litigation costs. . . . The combination of Model Rule 4.4, FRCP 26(b)(5)(b) and 
26(f)(3)(D), and Rule 502(d) demonstrates that rule makers and Congress have recognized 
the challenges facing lawyers to protect privileged and work-product documents while 
simultaneously trying to control litigation costs that are financially choking those lawyers’ 
clients. 
Barkett, supra note 3, at 1619–20. 
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not aware of an inadvertent disclosure serves only to punish the innocent.”219 
The court remarked, “Even if not driven by a warm feeling of collegiality, such 
deference to human fallibility would evince familiarity with the ancient wisdom 
of: ‘What goes around comes around.’”220 Revealing the staying power of the 
confusing ambiguity in the Model Rules when it comes to inadvertent 
disclosures, the court commented that “the spirit of Model Rule 4.4(b)” certainly 
required the receiving lawyer to forbear from seeking to use the inadvertent 
disclosure.221 
This is a clear example of how some courts demonstrate a loathsome 
response to a receiving lawyer’s use of inadvertent disclosures. Again, this 
Article does not take a position on what test should be applied to determine 
whether an inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege. If a 
jurisdiction follows the never-waived approach, then that rule of evidence would 
engender the ethical obligation that prohibits the receiving lawyer from using 
the inadvertent disclosure. Remarkably, even while the court was satisfied to 
apply the never-waived approach, it nevertheless felt compelled to enlist Model 
Rule 4.4(b) as another reason—an ethical reason—to rule against the receiving 
lawyer. Neither Model Rule 4.4(b) nor its gratuitous Comments provides 
support for the court, which should have stuck to its clear-eyed evidentiary 
ruling. That is why this Article seeks to modify Model Rule 4.4(b) so that a court 
and, ultimately, receiving lawyers rely on a proper analysis of the rules of 
evidence and rules of civil procedure (which incorporate private agreements) to 
resolve privilege claims for inadvertent disclosures. 
2. Always-Waived Approach 
What would be the ethical response on the opposite end of the spectrum if a 
jurisdiction followed an always-waived approach in which inadvertent 
disclosures always result in the waiver of the privilege? That would depend on 
how a lawyer chose to address inadvertent disclosures. Under proposed Model 
Rule 4.4(b), recall that a lawyer may follow default rules of evidence or opt-out 
 
 219. Eagle-North Hills Shopping Ctr., 239 F.R.D. at 685. 
 220. Id. at 686. Undoubtedly, there is comfort in knowing that opposing lawyers may enjoy 
reciprocity in favorable responses to regrettable disclosures of a client’s privileged information. 
Underscoring the “what goes around comes around” saying, one can hear the oft-quoted “there but 
for the grace of God go I.” Routinely attributed to John Bradford, the quote more accurately reads, 
“But for the grace of God there goes John Bradford.” See also, Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. 09-
1285, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7492, at *17 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010) (providing an ethical rule of 
thumb that “if something appears too good to be true, it probably is”). 
 221. Eagle-North Hills Shopping Ctr., 239 F.R.D. at 686. It should be obvious that this Article’s 
proposal seeks to end—once and for all—any misplaced reliance on the various spirits that arise 
from Model Rule 4.4(b), its penumbras, or the “larger, and more fundamental, framework” that 
Formal Opinion 92-368 found so illuminating. Instead, this Article’s proposal creates a clear, 
unmistakable, easy-to-follow rule that does not allow for various distractions. 
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in favor of private agreements. If the lawyer were convinced that it is improper 
to use inadvertent disclosures, then the lawyer may choose to enter a private 
agreement with either his client or an opposing lawyer to prohibit the use of 
those disclosures. The private agreement (incorporated into a scheduling order 
in the case of a mutual agreement between opposing lawyers in litigation) would 
then control a receiving lawyer’s ethical obligation. Absent a private agreement 
that prohibits use of inadvertent disclosures, a receiving lawyer’s ethical 
obligation would be to use the inadvertent disclosures unless prohibited by the 
rules of evidence. Because the rules of evidence would authorize such use in an 
always-waived jurisdiction, the receiving lawyer’s ethical duty would be to use 
the inadvertent disclosures to aid his client’s case. 
3. Negligence Approach 
As opposed to the never-waived or always-waived approaches, the 
negligence approach does not offer obvious solutions to every inadvertent 
disclosure issue.222 By tethering ethical obligations to those types of evidentiary 
rules, there will be uncertainty at times. That uncertainty does not arise from this 
Article’s proposal, however; it is driven by the evidentiary response to whether 
the privilege is waived. It will not affect a lawyer’s ability to comply with the 
clear ethics rule that this Article proposes. 
Again, Federal Rule of Evidence 502 codified the majority common-law 
approach to inadvertent disclosures that analyzed privilege issues under a 
negligence test. Under this approach, courts use the two-part analytical 
framework to determine whether an inadvertent disclosure waives the privilege. 
The first part will result in a no-waiver conclusion if (1) the disclosure was 
inadvertent; (2) the privilege holder “took reasonable steps to prevent 
disclosure”; and (3) “the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the 
error.”223 The second part is to determine whether the privilege holder “took 
reasonable steps,” which requires a consideration of these five factors: (1) the 
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the 
number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures; (4) any delay 
in measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5) overriding interests in 
justice.224 What can a receiving lawyer expect if his ethical obligations are 
governed by Rule 502? Because that depends on how a court applies the 
negligence test, this Article will explore five cases to analyze how receiving 
lawyers could have approached inadvertent disclosures under the proposed 
Model Rule 4.4(b). 
 
 222. One court has bemoaned the fact that it is not easy for lawyers to forecast how courts might 
rule on questions of waiver. Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 234 
(D. Md. 2005). 
 223. FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 224. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment. 
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a. Rhoads Industries v. Building Materials Corp. of America 
One case from Pennsylvania provides an extreme example of staggering 
carelessness in disclosing privileged material without resulting in a waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege. In Rhoads Industries, Inc. v. Building Materials 
Corp. of America,225 the plaintiff sent what it believed were 78,000 non-
privileged emails to the defendants.226 Complying with their obligations under 
Rule 26(b)(5)(B), the defendants notified the plaintiff that it had inadvertently 
disclosed over 800 privileged documents, segregated the documents, provided 
them to the court for review, and litigated the waiver issue.227 
The court asked whether the plaintiff had “at least minimally complied with 
the three factors stated in Rule 502, i.e., that the waiver was inadvertent, the 
party took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure, and attempted to rectify the 
error.”228 Concluding that the plaintiff had “shown at least minimal compliance 
with the three factors in Rule 502,” the court evaluated reasonableness under 
“the traditional five-factor test.”229 As the court analyzed each factor, it appeared 
that the court was going to rule in the defendants’ favor. The court concluded 
that the plaintiff had failed to act reasonably in failing to conduct sufficient 
searches and failing to sufficiently prepare for the segregation of privileged and 
non-privileged documents.230 The court’s analysis of the first four factors 
weighed heavily against the plaintiff who had been negligent in its failure to take 
precautions, the number and extent of inadvertently disclosed materials, and its 
post-disclosure measures.231 The court was nonplussed by this level of enduring 
negligence or the analytical weight of the first four factors. Instead, the court 
gave tremendous weight to the fifth factor of “the interest of justice.”232 The 
court concluded that because the loss of privilege “in a high-stakes, hard-fought 
litigation is a severe sanction and can lead to serious prejudice,” the fifth factor 
strongly favored the plaintiff and outweighed the four other factors.233 Further 
evoking images of injustice, the court saw no prejudice to the defendants who 
should have had no reason to expect access to the privileged communications in 
the first instance.234 
What would it have looked like had the proposed Model Rule 4.4(b) 
governed the receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations in Rhoads Industries? From 
the onset, the defendants’ lawyer should have recognized that because he was 
 
 225. 254 F.R.D. 216, 222 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 226. Id. at 222. 
 227. Id. at 218. 
 228. Id. at 226. 
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 230. Rhoads Industries, 254 F.R.D. at 226. 
 231. Id. at 227 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 227. 
 234. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] RETHINKING LAWYER ETHICS TO ALLOW THE RULES 283 
litigating in a jurisdiction that employed the negligence standard, Model Rule 
4.4(b) would have required him to use inadvertent disclosures if the plaintiff’s 
lawyer negligently disclosed privileged material. With the recognition that 
ethics rules might require the use of inadvertent disclosures, the receiving lawyer 
enjoyed the option to choose ahead of time to not pursue that legal benefit for 
his client under the rules of evidence by entering a private agreement with his 
client or opposing counsel. If he had entered a private agreement with opposing 
counsel to opt out of Rule 502’s default treatment of inadvertent disclosures, he 
would have been wise to incorporate the agreement in a protective order under 
Rules 26(f) and 16(a). And then when the plaintiff inadvertently disclosed 
privileged materials, the receiving lawyer simply would have complied with the 
protective order rather than trigger Rule 26(b)(5)(B) and seek to use the 
materials under the rules of evidence. 
If the defendants’ lawyer had not opted out of the default evidentiary rules 
through private agreement, however, then he would have been required to know 
how the rules of civil procedure and rules of evidence addressed the issue. Once 
he had received the inadvertent disclosures, he would have been required to 
proceed precisely as he did. Pointedly, he would have followed Rule 26(b)(5)(B) 
and Rule 502 to satisfy his ethical obligations. He would not have had the option 
to rely on an abstract feeling that he should not pursue his client’s lawful right 
to use the disclosed information. Under this Article’s proposal, there are no 
remnants of Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.4(b) that allow a receiving lawyer to 
ruminate on whether he will pursue inadvertent disclosures for his client when 
the rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure do not prohibit it. The only 
caveat here is if the receiving lawyer’s independent judgment in zealously 
advocating for his client led him to conclude that there was no chance that the 
privilege issue would go his way (i.e., it would have been frivolous to seek to 
use the privileged materials). In that case, he would have been authorized to 
forego trying to use the inadvertent disclosures. That is, if the receiving lawyer 
analyzed the rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure and concluded that 
those rules—as applied to his facts—would result in his inability to use the 
disclosed materials, then that inherently results in a legal conclusion that those 
rules prohibit such use, which would then govern his ethical obligation. 
b. Heriot v. Byrne 
Another illustration of how a receiving lawyer’s understanding of the rules 
of evidence would provide the proper ethical response to inadvertent disclosures 
comes from an Illinois court. In Heriot v. Byrne,235 the plaintiffs used a vendor-
created database to sort and flag documents for privileged information before 
producing documents to opposing counsel.236 Two months after producing 6952 
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pages to opposing counsel, the plaintiff discovered that privileged materials had 
been disclosed.237 Within twenty-four hours, the plaintiff asked the defendant to 
destroy the privileged materials.238 Holding that the inadvertent disclosures did 
not waive the privilege, the court permitted the plaintiff to claw back the 
privileged documents.239 Although the court recognized it was “not 
insignificant” that between five and thirteen percent of the produced materials 
were privileged, the court concluded that the plaintiff acted reasonably when he 
responded to the mistake within twenty-four hours of its discovery, took 
reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure when he employed a multi-step 
process to inspect the documents before he turned them over to the vendor, and 
timely remedied the inadvertent disclosure.240 In the final calculus, the court 
declared that “how the disclosing party discovers and rectifies the disclosure is 
more important than when after the inadvertent disclosure the discovery 
occurs.”241 
Had the receiving lawyer been laboring under this Article’s proposed Model 
Rule 4.4(b), he would have known that he was litigating a federal case in a 
jurisdiction that applied the negligence standard to waiver issues for inadvertent 
disclosures. He could have opted out of those rules through private agreements 
with his client or opposing counsel. If he had not chosen that route, the receiving 
lawyer would have faced an ethical dilemma when the plaintiff inadvertently 
produced privileged materials. At that point, Model Rule 4.4(b) would have 
required that the receiving lawyer notify the sending lawyer of the inadvertent 
disclosures. Whether the receiving lawyer would have been ethically required to 
try to use the privileged information would not have been so clear, because the 
evidentiary response was unclear. There absolutely would have been no ethical 
prohibition from making a good-faith argument that the privilege had been 
waived, which is how the receiving lawyer proceeded in Heriot. But perhaps it 
is not obvious that this Article’s proposed ethics rule might not have required 
the receiving lawyer to use the inadvertent disclosures. The rule only requires 
that a receiving lawyer use inadvertent disclosures unless prohibited by the rules 
of evidence. If a receiving lawyer reasonably concludes that the rules of 
evidence do not authorize use, he may forego an expensive effort to litigate the 
matter and return the privileged materials unused. One final observation, 
however, would be to underscore that private agreements provide protection 
against costly and lengthy battles in litigation over close calls on waiver issues. 
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c. Kandel v. Brother International Corp. 
One case from California demonstrates how rules of civil procedure work 
with rules of evidence to provide the adequate response to inadvertent 
disclosures. In Kandel v. Brother International Corp., between mid-June and 
mid-August, the defendants produced over 10,000 documents containing 67,678 
pages.242 Because many documents were in Japanese, the defendants conducted 
a Japanese language review and a privilege review.243 For help, the defendants 
hired a consultant.244 Even after extensive meetings, guidance on privilege 
issues, and instructions to run keyword searches to help segregate privileged 
documents, the defendants discovered that privileged documents had been 
produced.245 Immediately contacting the consultant, the defendants learned that 
the consultant had not run the instructed keyword searches.246 The defendants 
instructed the consultant to run keyword searches of all documents, including 
those already produced.247 This search revealed 722 privileged documents, of 
which 110 had been produced.248 The defendants promptly notified the plaintiffs 
about the inadvertent disclosures and triggered the agreed-upon procedures in 
the protective order under Rule 26(b)(5)(B).249 
Confronted with whether the inadvertent disclosures waived the attorney-
client privilege, the court held that because the defendants had acted reasonably 
in the face of the inadvertent disclosures, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) and Rule 502(b) 
guarded against waiver.250 Enforcing the clawback provision of the protective 
order, the court ordered the plaintiffs to return the privileged documents to the 
defendants.251 
Under Model Rule 4.4(b), the plaintiff would have been required to notify 
the defendants if the plaintiff had reason to know of the inadvertent disclosures. 
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This would have triggered the defendants to seek the shelter of the protective 
order even before the defendants actually did on their own. Because of the 
protective order, which resulted from a private agreement under Rule 
26(b)(5)(B) and Rule 502, the plaintiff was limited in its ability to use the 
inadvertent disclosures. That is a perfect illustration of how a receiving lawyer 
under this Article’s proposed Model Rule 4.4(b) would look to the rules of 
evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private agreements to know the proper 
ethical response to inadvertent disclosures. Had there been no private agreement 
or protective order, then the receiving lawyer would have sought to use the 
disclosures under the rules of evidence after complying with his ethical 
notification obligation. 
d. Gloucester Township Housing Authority v. Franklin 
An important federal case from New Jersey illustrates an opposite 
conclusion in which the court deemed the negligent disclosure of materials 
waived the attorney-client privilege. In Gloucester Township Housing Authority 
v. Franklin Square Associates,252 the court addressed the waiver issue by 
analyzing Rule 26(b)(5)(B), Rule 502(b), and the traditional five-factor 
negligence test.253 In that case, a landlord’s agent inadvertently disclosed two 
letters between itself and its lawyer while producing more than 3500 pages of 
documents.254 The court held that the negligent failure to take reasonable steps 
to prevent the disclosure or rectify the error resulted in a waiver of the 
privilege.255 The court recognized that because the volume of inadvertent 
disclosures—three out of more than 3500 pages—was de minimis, that factor 
supported the protection of the privilege.256 The court was more persuaded by 
other factors that revealed that the landlord was unable to identify any 
precautions that it had taken to prevent disclosure of privileged information, the 
letters were “clearly privileged, substantive information pertaining to this 
litigation” because they were “communications between attorney and client” and 
“‘warranted a significant level of scrutiny’ prior to production,” and the landlord 
made no attempt to rectify its erroneous disclosure for months.257 
This case reveals the perils of an overactive ethics rule that prohibits a 
receiving lawyer from using inadvertent disclosures to benefit his client. Had the 
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receiving lawyer labored under restrictive ethics rules, he would have returned 
the privileged material even though the rules of evidence and rules of procedure 
authorized the use of those materials for his client’s cause. This case illustrates 
the wisdom of this Article’s proposal to tether the receiving lawyer’s proper 
ethical response to inadvertent disclosures to the rules of evidence and rules of 
civil procedure. 
e. Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States 
Finally, the facts of a United States Court of Federal Claims case reveal how 
a receiving lawyer’s ethical response under this Article’s proposal would have 
been to use inadvertent disclosures to benefit his client. This clear ethical 
response would be different under current ethics rules. Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. 
United States258 is an open-and-shut case of failure to take reasonable steps to 
protect privileged information. During litigation, the defendant disclosed eight 
privileged files to the plaintiff.259 Surprisingly, at no point during the litigation 
over the loss of privilege did the defendant show the scope of its pre-disclosure 
screening processes or object to or rectify its mistake after discovering it.260 The 
defendant negligently took little or no remedial action!261 Concluding that the 
defendant failed to act reasonably, the court held that the defendant waived the 
attorney-client privilege for the disclosed documents.262 
Had the receiving lawyer labored under a murky understanding of his ethical 
obligations in light of the defendant’s obvious negligence, the lawyer might have 
chosen to return the materials without so much as a courtesy call to his client. 
That course would have been allowed under the current rules. Under this 
Article’s proposal, however, the only way that course would have been ethical 
is if the lawyer had opted out of the default rules of evidence through private 
agreement with his client or opposing counsel. Absent such an opt-out 
agreement, the receiving lawyer would have been required to ethically use the 
inadvertent disclosures unless prohibited by the rules of evidence or rules of civil 
procedure. Because the receiving lawyer was not subject to a restrictive 
protective order under the rules of civil procedure, the lawyer would have been 
required to use the evidence unless prohibited by the rules of evidence. Given 
the manifest negligence involved, the only proper ethical response would have 
been for the receiving lawyer to use the privileged information to benefit his 
client’s case. That is how it played out in the Eden Isle Marina case. 
It cannot go unnoticed that there could have been a particularly troublesome 
result for the receiving lawyer’s client had his lawyer labored under a false sense 
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of legal ethics by unilaterally choosing to not use the inadvertent disclosures for 
his client’s benefit and without his client’s knowledge. That would have been an 
option under the current Comments to Model Rule 4.4(b). That would have been 
an unfortunate result, because the rules of evidence allowed free use of the 
documents. This Article’s proposed amendment to Model Rule 4.4(b) would not 
authorize such a result short of private agreement, because the receiving 
lawyer’s ethical obligation would have been driven by the rules of evidence, 
rules of civil procedure, and private agreement instead of blind adherence to an 
overly restrictive ethics rule. 
V.  RULES OF ETHICS SHOULD NOT PREEMPT SOCIETY’S VALUES 
It is prudent to point out that this Article presupposes that ethics rules should 
not reject society’s values already embedded in the law; ethics rules should 
reflect those values. In 2010, I promoted “a well-defined investigation exception 
to the prohibition of attorney deception” in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.263 That article reasoned that “[i]f society has not outlawed the use of 
deception in [criminal, civil rights, and intellectual property investigations], then 
a set of ethics rules governing attorney behavior should not tamp down the 
ability of others to lawfully engage in deception for limited but equally important 
purposes.”264 That sentiment induces similar reasoning when it comes to 
inadvertent disclosures. If the rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure 
reflect society’s values on the appropriate response to inadvertent disclosures 
within a comprehensive system of justice, then “a set of ethics rules governing 
attorney behavior should not tamp down the ability” of a receiving lawyer to 
provide those legal benefits to his client. That is a catalyst behind this Article’s 
proposal. 
This desire to allow legal ethics to defer to other law comes with a word of 
caution. The search for the proper scope of ethics rules must “ensure that any 
unintended byproducts do not include the creation of distrust in the legal 
profession or the system of justice.”265 To safeguard that such distrust is not an 
unintended byproduct of this Article’s proposal, it is vital to re-emphasize that 
“the public should be conditioned to believe that attorneys are honest and fair 
rather than dishonest and deceptive.”266 One may contend that this Article’s 
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proposal would increase public perception that lawyers are deceptive. That is, 
one might argue that ethics rules that restrict the use of inadvertent disclosures 
allow lawyers to be viewed as honest and fair while rules that allow a lawyer to 
“take advantage” of inadvertent disclosures could be viewed as dishonest and 
deceptive. Not at all. Requiring lawyers to use inadvertent disclosures “unless 
prohibited by rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, or private agreement” 
encourages lawyers to follow the law. It protects every client within a just 
system by ensuring that everyone knows the rules of the game. That line of 
reasoning ensures that Model Rule 4.4(b) would align with society’s values on 
inadvertent disclosures that are embedded in other law—rules of evidence and 
rules of civil procedure—to deliver the greatest benefit to all clients, the 
profession, and the justice system. Curiously, current ethics rules allow—or 
perhaps encourage—deception, because the Comments to Model Rule 4.4(b) 
implicitly promote a lawyer’s unilateral and potentially uninformed decision to 
not use inadvertent disclosures. The Comments actually encourage a lawyer to 
make these decisions without so much as a whisper to the client or thoughtful 
consideration of whether the client has the lawful right to use that information. 
To remedy such an ill-advised consequence, lawyers “owe each other, the 
legal profession, the administration of justice, and the citizens that rely on our 
efforts, a full and open debate on the ethics of” inadvertent disclosures.267 This 
Article’s proposal shines sunlight on the inadvertent disclosure issue so that no 
one—including clients—are kept in the dark about a lawyer’s intentions and 
ethical obligations.268 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s tenor and tone reflects a sharp policy disagreement with those 
who seek to force the rules of ethics to govern inadvertent disclosure issues 
without fully considering how other laws inform the proper ethical response. 
This Article seeks to unify and harmonize potentially conflicting bodies of law 
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on inadvertent disclosures by ensuring that the rules of ethics play a supporting 
role in inadvertent-disclosure decisions by aligning them with governing rules 
of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and private agreements. This Article’s 
proposed amendment to Model Rule 4.4(b) is simple and straightforward: “The 
receiving lawyer shall use inadvertently disclosed documents or information 
unless prohibited by rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, or private 
agreement.” 
The law has long-contemplated the proper response to inadvertent 
disclosures, whether from an ethical or evidentiary viewpoint, but it has taken a 
series of baby steps over the past two decades that have generally traveled in this 
direction. This Article’s inadvertent-disclosure proposal ends the wandering 
with a clear rule that fairly balances the interests of the justice system, civility 
in the legal profession, and protection of clients. Now is the time to complete 
the journey by ensuring that the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, 
and private agreements—not the rules of ethics themselves—govern a receiving 
lawyer’s ethical obligation when confronted with inadvertent disclosures of 
privileged information. 
 
